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ABSTRACT 
Although it is widely understood that employers and employees are 
not equally situated, we fail to account adequately for this inequality in the 
law governing their relationship.  We can best understand this inequality in 
terms of status, which encompasses one’s level of economic resources, lei-
sure, and discretion.  For a variety of misguided reasons, contract law has 
been highly resistant to the introduction of status-based principles. Courts 
have preferred to characterize the unfavorable circumstances that many em-
  
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  J.D. Yale 
Law School; M.Sc. Oxford University; A.B. Harvard University.  Many thanks to partici-
pants at a faculty workshop at Penn Law School and the 4th Annual Colloquium on Current 
Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law for their feedback.  Special thanks to Cynthia 
Estlund, Kristin Madison, Stephen Perry, and Georg Reitboeck for their comments and sug-
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ployees face as the product of unequal bargaining power.  But bargaining 
power disparity does not capture the moral problem raised by inequality in 
the employment relation, and thus, it has failed to inspire any meaningful 
attempt to address that inequality.  By contrast, a status-based approach 
would motivate several common sense doctrinal changes. 
The persistent myth of equality is still more paradoxical in the context 
of statutory labor law.  Due to political constraints and several sources of 
uncertainty about its future, the National Labor Relations Act was limited to 
a bare bones framework for collective bargaining.  Later amendments and 
judicial interpretations entrenched a strictly procedural interpretation of the 
Act, oriented toward the goal of minimizing commercial disruption rather 
than disrupting status inequality.  The present regime sustains a false image 
of unions as equal in strength to employers, in need of only an illusive “lev-
el playing field.”  As a result, it does not effectively mitigate the negative 
dimensions of social status stemming from employment.  A few modest 
changes would help re-orient or at least broaden the Act so that unions can 
play a meaningful role in mitigating status inequality. 
INTRODUCTION 
Most myths are told and retold, and their plausibility derives from the 
repeated re-telling.  Other myths are latent.  They do not parade as truths; 
we may reject them in principle even as we abide by them in fact.  They 
survive because they are not explicit, and, therefore, not subject to adequate 
scrutiny.  The myth of equality in the employment relation takes the latter 
form. 
It is commonplace that employers and employees are not on equal 
footing.  The inequality between them is multi-dimensional.  Employers 
have more wealth.1  Employers have more bargaining power.2  Owners and 
managers are usually of higher social status.3   
  
 1. Employers are an ambiguously defined and heterogeneous group.  However, a 
number of facts suggest that they are wealthier than non-employers.  First, small-business-
owning households are “more than eight times as likely to be classified as high [wealth]” as 
households not owning a business (21.2% versus 2.5%).  George Haynes & Charles Ou, How 
Did Small Business-Owning Households Fare During the Longest U.S. Economic Expan-
sion?, 276 SMALL BUS. RES. SUMMARY 1 (2006).  Owners of private businesses represent just 
over 13% of the U.S. population but own almost half of the aggregate wealth.  See Marco 
Cagetti & Mariacristina De Nardi, Entrepreneurship, Frictions, and Wealth, 114 J. POL. 
ECON. 835, 839 (2006).  Business owners also represent more than three-quarters of the 
richest 1% of households.  Id.  One might argue that in publicly traded companies, share-
holders are the true owners and are not characteristically wealthy.  However, even if most 
shareholders are not wealthy, most shares are owned by the wealthy.  See Edward N. Wolff, 
Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and the Middle-Class 
Squeeze, 43 (The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 502, 2007), 
available at http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_502.pdf (noting that the wealthiest 20% own 
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These are familiar attributes of our social and economic environment.  
But though the related rhetoric of inequality is potent in the political con-
text, it is surprisingly inert in the domain of contract and even labor law.  To 
be sure, it is not entirely absent.  For example, employment cases often refer 
to the inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees.4  
More generally, the doctrines of good faith and modification can both be 
understood as concerned with preventing a party from exploiting a shift in 
bargaining power that takes place over the course of contract; they are not 
concerned, however, with the initial distribution of bargaining power.5  La-
bor law cases often espouse the objective of putting bargaining partners on 
an even playing field—on which those with superior “weapons” are entitled 
to prevail.6 
  
almost 90% of all stock); see also Lawrence Mishel et al., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 
2006/2007 78-79 (2007); Thomas W. Joo, Comment: Corporate Governance and the “D-
Word,” 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579, 1588 (2006).  Finally, managers of businesses owned 
by others, whom employees may perceive as their employer or at least exercising the power 
of an employer, are also wealthier than non-managerial employees.  See Howard Aldrich & 
Jane Weiss, Differentiation Within the United States Capitalist Class: Workforce Size and 
Income Differences, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 279, 280 (1981) (discussing variations in income and 
wealth among those who employ themselves and/or others). 
 2. See SYDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 660 (2d ed. 
1920) (1897).  See generally Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power: 
Changes Over Time and Implications for Public Policy, 10 J. LAB. RES. 285, 292-94 (1989) 
(describing changes in balance over time).  
 3. See Sharon Hannes, The Market for Takeover Defenses, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 125, 
170 (2007) (noting status benefits of managing a business); Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, 
What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 57 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001); BANKS 
MCDOWELL, ETHICAL CONDUCT AND THE PROFESSIONAL’S DILEMMA: CHOOSING BETWEEN 
SERVICE AND SUCCESS 15 (1991) (noting that corporate and business managers enjoy high 
social status); Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appro-
priate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 290-91 (1990) (noting status benefits of close 
corporation ownership); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, 
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 113 (1995) (discussing small business ownership as a “route” to higher 
social status). 
 4. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding employer “possesse[d] considerably more bargaining power than . . . its em-
ployees”). 
 5. See, e.g., Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) 
(refusing to enforce modification obtained by employees after relative bargaining power had 
shifted in their favor). 
 6. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (stipulating that the policies of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) were expected to restore equality of bargaining power between em-
ployers and employees); NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960) (“The 
presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the par-
ties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft–Hartley Acts have recog-
nized.”). 
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The inequality between employers and employees is frequently in-
voked in political rhetoric, as in order to justify changes in the tax code or 
trade policy that ostensibly will make it more difficult or costly to move 
jobs overseas, or to explain why the general balance of political power dis-
favors the working class.7  But it is seldom invoked to justify specific inter-
ventions in the employment relationship itself, and those interventions are 
still more rarely promoted or defended as means by which to undermine the 
prevalence of economic and occupational status.8  Direct regulation of the 
terms of the employment relationship in the United States, as in laws pro-
viding for statutory leave and notice of termination, is startlingly limited in 
comparison to other developed democracies.9  Nevertheless, what regulation 
exists is of great controversy. 
I do not argue here that judges should undertake through adjudication 
of individual disputes to recognize or redress this inequality just because it 
has purchase in the political domain.  Even if appropriately invoked in poli-
tics, there may be good reasons for setting aside the issue when developing 
and applying law, especially judge-made law.  I will not address arguments 
from institutional competency or democratic accountability at length here, 
but will focus instead on the substantive choice of whether contract and 
labor law should reflect status inequalities.  A contract and labor law that 
reflects status inequality would differ from existing law in certain concrete 
ways, and while it is not the ambition of this Article to fully consider the 
merits and demerits of these doctrinal reforms, some possible changes will 
  
 7. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes & Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Asks Curb on Use of 
Havens to Reduce Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A1; Robin Toner, A New Populism 
Spurs Democrats on the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A1. 
 8. Richard Epstein has argued categorically against the recognition of status in 
contract.  See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the 
New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1364-66 (1983) (“[C]ommon law rules in 
their ideal form make legal entitlements among strangers without reference to personal sta-
tus. . . . Individuals should not have to sacrifice their rights against the rest of the world be-
cause they become an employer of A or an employee of B.  Stating propositions in general 
form is, moreover, a powerful antidote to abuse and favoritism, even if standing alone it 
cannot guarantee a just set of rules or outcomes. . . .  As the identities of the contracting 
parties and the terms on which they contract are of no special concern to the state, a contract 
between an employer and an employee is indistinguishable from one between two prospec-
tive employees.”). 
 9. See Richard N. Block, Work-Family Legislation in the United States, Canada, 
and Western Europe: A Quantitative Comparison, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 333, 355 (2007); Carol 
Daugherty Rasnic, Balancing Respective Rights in the Employment Contract: Contrasting 
the U.S. “Employment-at-Will” Rule with the Worker Statutory Protections Against Dismis-
sal in European Community Countries, 4 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 441, 442 (1995); Americo Pla 
Rodriquez, Termination of Employment on the Initiative of the Employer, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 
221, 221 (1982); Janice R. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guar-
antee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 207, 207 (1983); Jack Stieber, Protection Against Unfair 
Dismissal: A Comparative View, 3 COMP. LAB. L. 229, 229 (1980). 
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be discussed below.  On the assumption that we cannot start from scratch, 
the proposals are for modest interventions that will mitigate employees’ 
experience of status.  The interventions would be “status based” inasmuch 
as they would not depend on or be justified with reference to either employ-
er–employee contractual intent or general defects in the process of contract 
formation.  Instead, reforms targeted toward status inequality would have 
the express aim of undercutting the dependency and persistent inequality of 
circumstance characteristic of status hierarchies. 
I begin with the premise that many, if not most, employment relation-
ships are characterized by such dependency and lifetime inequality.  But 
even if there really is an inequality of power and status between employers 
and employees, and even if we generally disfavor this inequality, this does 
not mean it should be taken into account at the level of the employment 
contract.  There are many situations where we have reasons to believe that 
are separate from the empirical truth-value of a claim.  We may have reason 
to proceed as if employers and employees are equally situated, even if they 
are not.  I will argue that there are now no such good reasons. 
Several reasons may motivate the persistent myth of equality in the 
individual employment relationship.10  First, the move from status to free 
contract in employment relations took centuries, and reintroducing the no-
tion of status in contract, however benignly intended, might risk a step 
backward.  The United States is committed to being not only race blind, but 
also class blind.  Second, historically dominant theories of contract have 
emphasized the significance of will and promise, and, at first blush, the 
moral salience of neither appears to turn on status.  Third, it may be too 
costly to tailor the rules of contract to the specific situations of contracting 
parties, as opposed to limiting the court’s inquiry to the contract itself and 
related communications.  Fourth, while mandatory terms are an alternative 
to tailored application of doctrine, they are blunt instruments.  Interventions 
motivated by inequality may take the form of Pareto-inferior mandatory 
terms, i.e., some or even most workers may prefer contracts without terms 
imposed for their benefit in exchange for some other term or modification.  
For example, workers may prefer not to have work time limitations if they 
can secure a higher wage rate for extra work hours. 
There are other reasons to believe in equality in the context of collec-
tive labor agreements.11  Indeed, the National Labor Relations Act12 regime 
has been constructed as if only an even legal playing field were necessary to 
secure social justice.  This reflects in part salient policy goals and the politi-
cal climate during the formative legislative period, as well as uncertainty at 
  
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
151-169 (2006)). 
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that time with respect to the future balance of power between unions and 
employers.  It also reflects a risk-averse strategy on the part of labor.  Pro-
employer and pro-labor agendas and ideologies converged on a procedural 
approach to labor reform predicated on a myth of potential equality.  Later, 
the more conservative political climate in which the ambiguities of the sta-
tutory regime of collective bargaining were resolved entrenched a procedur-
al interpretation of the Act.   
In the end, both theory and politics, for a hodgepodge of reasons, have 
projected equality onto the employment relation.  Some of the reasons I will 
consider are residual and no longer relate to compelling accounts of contract 
or labor.  Others are plausible in principle but fail on a contemporary under-
standing of the facts.  After describing some of the ways in which contract 
law perpetuates the myth of equality in the employment relation, in Part I, I 
will consider the kinds of reasons that contract and (individual) employment 
law might have to accept or reject the presumption of equality in Part II.  I 
also will show why each should be rejected, and briefly discuss initial doc-
trinal changes that we could adopt upon recognizing the work of status.  In 
Part III, I will identify and reject the reasons that apply in the context of 
collective bargaining.  Again, I will briefly discuss certain doctrinal changes 
we might consider to begin a limited reorientation of the law of collective 
bargaining. 
I.  THE MYTH OF EQUALITY 
The myth of equality in the employment relation is not quite like the 
myth of Icarus.  It too is told and retold, but its telling is implicit rather than 
explicit.  Still, like other myths, the myth of equality inspires and instructs 
notwithstanding its widely acknowledged falsehood. 
The myth of equality is manifest in the perceived plausibility of a se-
ries of three propositions: (1) any injustice or unfairness arising out of the 
employment agreement stems from inequality of bargaining power; (2) this 
inequality of bargaining power causes employees to accept terms that are 
unfavorable to them; and (3) employees could perhaps obtain more favora-
ble terms if they were willing to accept a lower wage, but they prefer a 
higher wage with less favorable accompanying terms. 
Numerous courts have observed a disparity in bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees, and many have justified pro-employee 
defaults or interpretations on this basis.13  To be sure, there is a disparity in 
  
 13. See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205, 213 (1st Cir. 
1971) (noting that any doubt over the definition of a term would be resolved against the 
employer, because the “agreement was a standard form contract drawn up by [the employer]” 
who “had superior bargaining power”); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 
6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (“Given the lack of choice and the potential disadvantages that 
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bargaining power between most (but not all) employers and employees in 
that employees usually face a more limited set of employment options than 
do employers seeking to fill open positions.  The problem is that a disparity 
in bargaining power is characteristic of many if not most contractual set-
tings.  Most major retailers exercise bargaining power relative to individual 
consumers.14  Many successful firms exercise bargaining power vis-à-vis 
business partners who are smaller, less successful, have tighter margins, or 
whose products or needs are more time-constrained for other reasons.  Thus, 
the bare fact that one contracting party is more powerful than the other, and, 
therefore, able to extract terms favorable to it, tells us little about the fair-
ness of the transaction, let alone the need for legal treatment favorable to the 
weaker party.15 
The doctrine of unconscionability has adapted to reflect this reality.16  
Thus, even if a disparity in bargaining power were to be regarded as a defect 
in the bargaining process, such a procedural anomaly would be insufficient 
to render a contract voidable under that doctrine.  Courts will further inquire 
whether the resulting contract is substantively unconscionable, that is, 
whether its terms “shock the conscience.”17  This vague standard saves most 
  
even a fair arbitration system can harbor for employees, we must be particularly attuned to 
claims that employers with superior bargaining power have imposed one-sided, substantively 
unconscionable terms as part of an arbitration agreement.”); Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic 
Techs., Inc., 941 A.2d 309, 325 (Conn. 2008) (“[B]ecause the employer generally enjoys 
superior bargaining power in the employment relationship, it is incumbent upon the employ-
er to make any obligation for reimbursement explicit in the employment agreement.”).  See 
also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945) (noting that the Fair 
Labor Standards Act was enacted in order to aid those “employees who lack[] sufficient 
bargaining power to secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage”).  But see generally 
Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396 
(2009) (suggesting a role for default rules that favor the party with more bargaining power, 
on the grounds that it will reduce their incentive to elaborate terms and thereby reduce trans-
action costs). 
 14. See Schwartz v. Alltel Corp., No. 86810, 2006 WL 2243649, at *6 (Ohio Ct. 
App. June 29, 2006) (finding that there is an “inherent disparity of the bargaining position” 
between the consumer and “a multi-billion dollar corporation”). 
 15. Legal economists frequently observe that “[u]nequal bargaining power is not a 
problem that will cause markets not to provide all benefits that workers are willing to pay 
for, nor is unequal bargaining power a type of market failure.”  Ian Ayres & Stewart Schwab, 
The Employment Contract, Presentation given at the Economic Analysis of State Employ-
ment Law Symposium, in 8:3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 75 (1999). 
 16. See Clark v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 706 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2005) (citing Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719, 723 (1987)) 
(“In order for a contract or contract provision to be considered unconscionable, both proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability must be present.”).  Accord Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 
690; Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d 252, 256 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2006); Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998); Doyle v. 
Fin. Am., LLC, 918 A.2d 1266, 1274 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).  
 17. Clark, 706 N.W.2d at 475. 
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retail and other commercial contracts; indeed, it is intended to be a high 
standard, under which only truly exceptional contracts will fail.  For exam-
ple, while most consumers are not in a position to bargain over the terms on 
which they purchase ordinary consumer goods, the normal operation of 
competitive consumer markets ensures that the identical, take-it-or-leave-it 
terms on which goods are offered are usually quite responsive and favorable 
to consumers.  Thus, few retail contracts will be deemed unconscionable, 
irrespective of the absence of a bargaining process or bargaining power on 
the part of consumers.  It is even more difficult to show unconscionability in 
the commercial context.  Because businesses are expected and permitted to 
exploit normal business advantages (so long as those advantages do not 
legally qualify as anticompetitive), the ability of a supplier or distributor to 
unilaterally set the terms of business is of little legal consequence.  The 
terms on which businesses do business with each other will never shock the 
conscience such that those terms can be voided. 
Given that disparity of bargaining power is pervasive and of inconsis-
tent effect, it is not surprising that acknowledging disparity in bargaining 
power between employers and employees has not been of systematic conse-
quence.  One prominent arena in which employer control has been chal-
lenged has been in the context of arbitration terms, which often require most 
claims against the employer to be submitted to an arbitrator of the employ-
er’s choice and under the employer’s control.  The Supreme Court has held 
that “[m]ere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to 
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment 
context,”18 and this holding has come to mean that they are usually en-
forced.19  More generally, courts are unwilling to strike down terms that 
were not negotiated, even if the employee lacked opportunity to negotiate 
them, unless there is further, independent suggestion of unconscionability or 
wrongdoing.20 
If the concept of unequal bargaining power is neither unique nor po-
tent in the employment context, why does it persist as our most ready cha-
racterization of that relationship?  In searching for a way to articulate the 
problem endemic in most employment relations, inequality of bargaining 
power is appealing because it would appear to speak to a defect recogniza-
ble on the terms of classical, formal contract theory.  It appears to bear some 
  
 18. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). 
 19. See, e.g., Brennan v. CIGNA Corp., Nos. 06-5027, 06-5124, 2008 WL 2441049, 
at *3 (3d Cir. June 18, 2008) (“More than a disparity in bargaining power is needed to show 
that an arbitration agreement between an employer and its employee was not entered into 
willingly . . . .”). 
 20. See, e.g., Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 761 (Wash. 2004) 
(holding an adhesion contract of employment was not procedurally unconscionable when the 
employee’s argument rested solely on her lack of bargaining power). 
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relation to duress, a doctrine of longstanding pedigree and incontrovertible 
standing.  That is, if duress is the deprivation of complete choice, disparity 
of bargaining power results in the less drastic constraint of choice.  The 
boundaries of duress are vague—it is not always clear under what circums-
tances we are prepared to characterize contractual consent as having been 
forced.  That makes it all the more appealing to have a sibling concept like 
unconscionability, which will pick up some of the cases in the penumbra—
those cases where the constraint on choice was severe enough to undermine 
the normative significance of consent but not so complete as to empty it of 
force altogether. 
But employees, while admittedly weak vis-à-vis their employers, are 
rarely subject to anything like duress.  A contract is formed under duress 
when one party forces another to accept an agreement where the latter has 
no choice but to agree.21  It is only duress, however, if the defendant created 
the circumstances under which the weaker party acted; otherwise, the de-
fendant cannot be said to have “forced” the weaker party, but only to have 
exploited it.22  Most obviously, employers rarely have individually created 
the circumstances of constrained choice in which their employees and pros-
pective employees operate.  But also, employees—at least in the United 
States—are rarely so desperate that we could plausibly say they had no 
choice but to accept the terms offered by a given employer.  Emphasizing 
this desperation where it exists can actually be distracting because it con-
verts the problem of relative inequality into one of absolute poverty.  Inas-
much as the relevance of disparity of bargaining power hinges on its famili-
al relationship to duress, the obvious ways in which employees do exercise 
choice and, in any case, were not deprived by choice by their employers 
make the analogy irrelevant in all but the most extreme circumstances.  This 
brings us to the second misleading proposition. 
The second misconception that sustains the latent myth of status 
equality between employers and employees is the proposition that inequality 
of bargaining power causes employees, under conditions of constrained 
choice, to accept terms that are unfavorable to them.  Just as duress might 
cause one to part with one’s money rather than one’s life, disparity in bar-
gaining power will cause one to accept an ungenerous sick-leave policy 
rather than remain unemployed.  This understanding of what takes place 
when employees accept unfavorable terms no doubt has a great deal of truth 
  
 21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Du-
ress and Undue Influence § 1 (2004).  See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 351 
(N.H. 2003); Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999).  
 22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979) (stating the require-
ment that defendant has engaged in an improper threat).  See also Aditi Bagchi, Distributive 
Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 126-30 (2008) (providing a detailed dis-
cussion of the distinction between duress and exploitation). 
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to it, but it is also misleading.  Employees are often simply unaware of the 
full package for which they are signing up.23  Even where employers have 
written policies, these are often broad, flexible, inconsistent, or simply am-
biguous.24  Employees lack information about the interpretation and applica-
tion of that policy, on which its favorability or unfavorability will often 
turn.25  Moreover, employers rarely explain, nor could they explain in ad-
vance, the precise boundaries of an employee’s obligations, the probability 
of better terms in the future, and other characteristics of the work environ-
ment that determine the quality of work life.  The employment agreement is 
an incomplete one.26  At best, the employee agrees that a number of matters 
will be settled later. 
Employees also lack information relevant to understanding that those 
terms that are known to them are unfavorable, such as the alternative pack-
ages available in the market, and the alternatives financially or administra-
tively feasible at the particular firm at which they are, or are to be, em-
  
 23. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for 
Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 95 (2006); Cynthia L. Estlund, 
How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 6, 19-20 (2002); Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending 
Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause 
Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307 (2002). 
 24. For examples of ambiguous and inconsistent policies, see Campbell v. Gen. 
Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 557-58 (1st Cir. 2005) (e-mail ambiguously stat-
ing an arbitration policy); Hubner v. Cutthroat Commc’ns, Inc., 80 P.3d 1256 (Mont. 2003) 
(employer handbook simultaneously claiming and disclaiming enforceability); Trabing v. 
Kinko’s, Inc., 57 P.3d 1248 (Wyo. 2002) (handbook ambiguous as to at-will status). 
 25. See Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Comment, Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s New 
Non-Compete Agreement Law & the Broadcasting Industry, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 447, 472 
(2009) (noting that “many employees do not know that their agreement may be unenforcea-
ble”); see also Pierre H. Bergeron, Navigating the “Deep and Unsettled Sea” of Covenant 
Not To Compete Litigation in Ohio: A Comprehensive Look, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 373, 373 
(2000); Kevin C. Marcoux, Section 8(b)(1)(A) from Allis-Chalmers to Pattern Makers’ 
League: A Case Study in Judicial Legislation, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (1986); DeCami-
nada v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 591 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that 
the FAA did not require “knowledge,” and an otherwise valid arbitration clause did not de-
pend on whether a party was “specifically aware of its scope”). 
 26. See KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 152 (2004) (“Employment contracts are fa-
mously incomplete . . . .  It is well understood that employment contracts embody shared 
understandings and mutually agreed terms that are not a part of the formal contractual appa-
ratus.”).  See also Aditi Bagchi, Note, Unions and the Duty of Good Faith in Employment 
Contracts, 112 YALE L.J. 1881, 1886-90 (2003); Katherine M. Apps, Good Faith Perfor-
mance in Employment Contracts: A “Comparative Conversation” Between the U.S. and 
England, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 883, 890 (2006); Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell 
& Ian Ramsay, Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: Intersections Between Corporate 
Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 417, 460 (2005); Gregory K. 
Dow, The New Institutional Economics and Employment Regulation, in GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 57, 57-59 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997). 
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ployed.  Thus, while the employee no doubt consents to the arrangement for 
contract purposes, it is misleading to say that the employee has accepted 
unfavorable terms per se. 
For the same reason, it is also misleading to say, as is often said, that 
employees could perhaps obtain more favorable terms if they were willing 
to accept a lower wage, but they prefer the higher wage with less favorable 
accompanying terms.27  As argued above, many employees are operating 
under great uncertainty such that, to the extent there is a trade-off for pay, 
the first choice is between ignorance and uncertainty, rather than between 
favorable and unfavorable terms.  More generally, to make the claim that 
employees prefer less favorable terms for higher pay is to run an implicit 
hypothetical about what employees would do.  But the hypothetical is am-
biguous.  One could ask what a particular worker would have agreed to with 
a particular firm, or one might ask what workers with certain characteristics 
would likely agree to with firms of a certain type.  And one might take the 
employee as she is, in the hypothetical, or one might correct for cognitive 
biases and information shortfalls.28  One must make assumptions about the 
absolute level of wages and other benefits to be traded off, and about back-
ground conditions, such as employment and other support available (or not) 
to the employee.  One must decide generally what the rules of bargaining 
will be.29 
Certainly, there is a sense in which many employees would accept, ce-
teris paribus, higher wages for fewer paid vacation days, or less generous 
sick leave.  But their choices will differ depending on a number of factors, 
and there is nothing natural about any single set of assumptions.  The very 
fact that workers in many developed democracies receive higher benefits 
with and sometimes without lower pay should give us pause before we posit 
that all negative aspects of the typical U.S. employment relationship have 
been or would be freely accepted in exchange for higher pay. 
If inequality of bargaining is not the root of the problem, then what is?  
The preliminary point is that inequality of bargaining power is inadequate to 
account for observed outcomes in the employment relation; we need to look 
further to information deficiencies.  But the more important point is that 
inequality of bargaining power is inadequate to explain what is objectiona-
ble about observed outcomes, even if it nominally causes the employer to 
appropriate a disproportionate share of the surplus created by the employ-
ment relation.  The distribution of that surplus is not disproportionate in 
  
 27. See, e.g., Ayres & Schwab, supra note 15, at 72. 
 28. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract 
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1817 (1991).  Charny labels these choices with “ge-
nerality” and “idealization.”  Id. at 1820. 
 29. See P.S. Atiyah, Contract and Fair Exchange, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 19 (1985) 
(doubting that “neutral principles of fair procedure” exist in the “contractual sphere”). 
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some objective mathematical sense; there is no particular reason to expect 
an even distribution—that is not what we observe in most contracts.  Rela-
tive bargaining power is a property of the bilateral relationship between an 
employee and employer, but the problem with the employment relation lies 
elsewhere.  We need to zoom out and focus on the inequality between the 
larger social groups to which employees and employers belong.  The notion 
of status is useful in capturing a number of the dimensions of that problem.  
Obviously, not all employees are low status and not all employers are high 
status.  Notably, in larger companies, many shares are held by widely dis-
persed small investors, including those whose only equity assets lie in their 
retirement accounts.  Nevertheless, legal treatment of the employment rela-
tion is significant in part because low social status is rooted in one’s cir-
cumstances of employment. 
Status can be taken to refer either to the capacities and incapacities of 
the members of a group, or more specifically as the “sum of legal conditions 
imposed by the operation of law.”30  I use it in the former, more expansive 
sense, not least because my point turns on the fact that a too-zealous com-
mitment to avoiding legal status may actually fortify the work of social sta-
tus.  Status, in this broad sense, might generally refer to the actual lack of 
capacity to pursue various projects and pleasures that others of higher status 
might ordinarily expect to be able to pursue, but also to the common and 
relatively open acknowledgement of that diminished capacity.  Thus, to be 
of relatively low social status may mean more than not having the opportu-
nity to study Shakespeare, not spending a summer traveling in Europe, or 
not having believed for a full year or even two that one might be able to 
make a living writing novels or music.  It means living in a society where 
whatever material facts underpin those realities are commonly and openly 
assumed to apply to that person. 
The specific incapacities associated with low social status are difficult 
to articulate, but I will attempt a rough sketch here.31  First, while low social 
status in the United States is associated with limited economic resources, 
being of “low income” is a more specified condition than just the bare 
amount of income and wealth would reveal.  To be of low income implies 
that one can afford certain things but not others, even if, in principle, either 
is equally possible or impractical at a given income.  Thus, to be of low 
income implies one cannot afford piano lessons, but it does not mean one 
cannot afford brand name sneakers.  It may mean one cannot afford fresh 
tropical fruits, but it does not mean one cannot afford cigarettes.  What one 
  
 30. Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Some Reflections on Status and Freedom, in ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 222, 222 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1962). 
 31. See generally BETH SHULMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF WORK: HOW LOW-WAGE JOBS 
FAIL 30 MILLION AMERICANS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2003); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL 
AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001). 
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can afford at a low income depends on the hierarchy of needs projected onto 
and perceived at the associated status level because the socially constructed 
order of needs determines what falls above and below the financially deter-
mined cutoff.  Nevertheless, while that order itself varies with status be-
cause it is perhaps surprisingly uniform across class, having limited eco-
nomic resources has certain systematic consequences in terms of access to a 
relatively fixed set of goods, services, and experiences. 
A second dimension of low status is limited leisure time.  At very low 
incomes, individuals must work a large number of hours at one or more jobs 
in order to pay monthly bills, including minimum credit card payments.  
Excepting those with multiple jobs, one might expect that individuals of 
higher income actually work more hours.32  However, to some extent the 
large number of work hours is offset by the ability to purchase services that 
reduce the amount of time spent on unpaid housework and family care.  
Finally, individuals of higher social status are more likely to be entitled to 
sick leave and paid vacation and more likely to have incomes that enable 
them to obtain medical care and take vacations away from home, both of 
which enhance the value of leisure time. 
The final dimension of status, as I refer to it here, is the lack of discre-
tion and power within the employment relation itself.33  Persons of lower 
social status have less discretion over the clothing they may wear to work, 
whether and when they may take breaks, leave work early, and take time off 
for personal or health reasons.  They also have less discretion about how to 
perform the tasks for which they are responsible at work.  Finally, they have 
less choice about the actual site of employment because they are likely to 
have fewer job opportunities. 
The problem of status, as the concept is used here, is related to but dis-
tinct from both the concept of class and the question of intergenerational 
  
 32. But see Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer?: A 
Focusing Illusion, 312 SCI. 1908, 1910 (2006) (arguing that women with higher-incomes 
actually spend more time in “obligatory” activities and less time on enjoyable passive lei-
sure).  While the empirical point is ultimately beyond the scope of this Article, it is not im-
plausible that the relationship between income and leisure varies by sex.  Moreover, the self-
reporting on which an empirical study must rely may also undermine its credibility. 
 33. See Jane Wardle et al., Sex Differences in the Association of Socioeconomic 
Status with Obesity, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1299, 1299 (2002) (“Low-status jobs are asso-
ciated with lack of autonomy . . . .”); Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The 
Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
955, 992-93 n.156 (1988) (“[L]abor processes differ between secondary or peripheral firms, 
with low wage and low status jobs, where simple, traditional forms of control prevail (direct 
coercion, paternalism, threat of dismissal), and primary or core enterprises, where capital 
employs bureaucratic-authoritarian forms of control, which frequently include greater re-
liance on incentives and worker autonomy.”); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and 
Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1226 (1983) (“[C]onstrained judgment is 
associated with the proletarian characteristics of low status and reward . . . .”). 
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mobility.  While there is obvious overlap between the notions of class and 
status, class has historically turned on one’s role inside or outside of produc-
tion, and has often referred to the group of all such similarly situated per-
sons.34  The concept of class has been important in theories (or hopes or 
predictions) of collective action directed toward achieving new modes of 
production, or reform of entire political economic structures.35  Status is a 
more micro-oriented idea that applies first and foremost to the individual.36  
It refers not to a collective state, but to a commonality or parallel between 
the socioeconomic situations of numerous persons.  While class analysts are 
usually interested in class as an independent variable, i.e., its causal role in 
explaining political economic dynamics as well as the quality and character 
of individual lives, the notion of status aims to characterize the results of 
social sorting.37   
I take “status” to be conceptually agnostic about the ultimate sources 
of the condition to which it refers.  For example, status might be determined 
by occupation, race, sex, religion, and/or any number of other common so-
cial markers.  In itself, it implies nothing about its own remedy.38  Finally, 
status hierarchies are not universal.  Class is fundamentally a function of 
  
 34. There is no universally accepted concept of either status or class, and, therefore, 
no agreement on the relation between the concepts.  What follows is, in part, my characteri-
zation of how the terms are often used, but ultimately my statement of how I will use the 
terms. 
 35. The concept of class has been criticized as no longer relevant or helpful in un-
derstanding contemporary society.  See generally PAUL W. KINGSTON, THE CLASSLESS 
SOCIETY (2000); JAN PAKULSKI & MALCOLM WATERS, THE DEATH OF CLASS (1996). 
 36. Some sociologists have proposed reorienting the concept of class toward “micro-
level” explanations of life conditions by focusing on occupational hierarchies.  See Kim A. 
Weeden & David B. Grusky, The Case for a New Class Map, 111 AM. J. SOC. 141, 142 
(2005) (arguing that “occupations are better suited than big classes for the new microlevel 
agenda of explaining individual-level behaviors and attitudes”).  To the extent class is recon-
ceived in this manner, the distinction between class and status fades.  See Alejandro Portes, 
The Resilient Importance of Class: A Nominalist Interpretation, 14 POL. POWER & SOC. 
THEORY 249, 250-51, 257 (2000). 
 37. See John H. Goldthorpe, Occupational Sociology, Yes: Class Analysis, No: 
Comment on Grusky and Weeden’s Research Agenda, 45 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 211, 212 
(2002) (“The aim is then to show how different class positions, as understood via these con-
cepts, create different sets of constraints and opportunities for the individuals who hold them; 
and, in turn, to explain class-linked variation, both in what happens to individuals and in how 
they typically act, via causal processes that originate in their different ‘class situations.’”). 
 38. Status can be used as an explanatory variable as well, and in that context could 
be competitive with class.  See Michael Hechter, From Class to Culture, 110 AM. J. SOC. 
400, 405 (2004) (“In a society where castes are relatively impermeable and occupationally 
specialized, each caste is simultaneously a class and a status group.  In social formations 
having ample prospects for occupational mobility, however, class and status are more likely 
to be mutually competitive.”).  However, consistent with its use in legal discourse, I am 
using “status” here to characterize rather than explain certain socioeconomic circumstances.  
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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one’s relation to production, and one needs only a few related facts about a 
person to identify her class in any society.39  But to the extent occupation 
determines status, it does so more indirectly.  The status of any given occu-
pation in a society turns on contingent features of that society that lead the 
occupation to be highly or poorly compensated, associated with extensive or 
limited leisure, and subject to strict controls or relative autonomy.  Contin-
gent social facts also determine how any given occupation is perceived 
along those dimensions.  For all these reasons, speaking about status—
however perilous—implies and carries less baggage than does class-based 
discourse. 
The problem of status is also separate from that of intergenerational 
mobility.40  The notion of status implies some stagnancy—one would not 
readily characterize a society in which the properties associated with status 
are fluid and apply to different persons at different periods in their lives as a 
status-ridden society.  Moreover, it is likely that many of the material condi-
tions associated with status, and the economic conditions that reinforce it, 
also undermine intergenerational mobility.  In the United States, intergene-
rational mobility increased until about 1980 and has declined ever since.41  
But even to the extent mobility is present, it is likely to take place between 
childhood and adulthood, i.e., some children born to low-income parents 
may be high-earners in their adulthood.  The experience of a single, perhaps 
oppressive, status over the course of adulthood remains. 
While promoting intergenerational mobility is desirable for many rea-
sons, it should not exhaust our concern for the persistence of status in adult-
hood.  The rhetoric of equal opportunity emphasizes, almost to the point of 
exclusivity, the social interest in ensuring all doors are open to children or 
young adults first “setting out.”42  That interest is real and unique in its mul-
tiple motivations, though the reality is that even if opportunities were as 
open as they could ever be, one’s life course would reflect not just one’s 
  
 39. At least in the tradition of Marx and Weber.  See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY 926-40 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). 
 40. The concept of intergenerational mobility is itself ambiguous.  See Dirk Van de 
Gaer, Erik Schokkaert & Michel Martinez, Three Meanings of Intergenerational Mobility, 68 
ECONOMICA 519 (2001).  I take the concept as largely descriptive, referring to changes in 
status within families, across generations, but normatively motivated by commitment to 
equality of opportunity and/or equality of life chances. 
 41. Daniel Aaronson & Bhashkar Mazumder, Intergenerational Economic Mobility 
in the United States, 1940 to 2000, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 139, 141 (2008).   
 42. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Better Schools, Bush Says, Honor Dr. King, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 2001, at A19 (quoting George W. Bush: “The fundamental question is, is every child 
learning?  Access is equal, but not opportunity, when not all children are learning in Ameri-
ca.”); Susan Collins, Senator of Maine, Excerpts From the Republican Party’s Response to 
the President’s Address, Reply to President Clinton’s State of the Union Address, in N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2000, at A18 (“Our four-point plan for educational excellence will ensure 
that all children have an equal opportunity to reach their full potential.”). 
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own choices and capabilities, but one’s parents’ choices and expectations.  
But on the approach taken here, robust social categories of status would be a 
problem even if low status as an adult reflected only one’s own poor choices 
in early adulthood. 
In this, the approach here is consistent with the intuitions mobilized in 
the nineteenth century against indentured servitude—against not just the 
trickery, deceit, or abuse associated with the practice, but against the very 
idea that one could be bound completely to another by virtue of a trade 
made at some earlier moment in time.  Status would matter even if there 
was intergenerational mobility, and even if it was in each instance traceable 
to earlier free acts of the individual.  This is in part because we are not pre-
pared to collapse entirely our personal identities at different periods of our 
lives, and are therefore unwilling to hold a later self fully responsible for the 
choices of a former self.  It is in part because the individual experience of 
low status is morally unattractive, in that it makes more difficult human 
flourishing in the familiar forms we find valuable.  And it is in part because 
low status is only low relative to high status, and the fact of extreme inequa-
lity in a society marks institutional injustice irrespective of the micro paths 
by which individuals are sorted into available slots.  With or without equal 
opportunity, we have many reasons to reform a legal regime that sustains 
low status as a social category characterized by a life of limited resources, 
limited leisure, and the everyday experience of disempowerment. 
One might argue that when one focuses on the material dimensions of 
low status, it is impossible to distinguish it from low bargaining power.  
After all, the two are related, and one might find bargaining power more 
useful in explaining why some workers are paid little, have long hours, li-
mited vacation, and limited discretion in the workplace.  While the circums-
tances characterized by low status are indeed also usually characterized by 
low bargaining power, there are strong reasons to move away from our em-
phasis on bargaining power and speak directly about status. 
Consider the following analogy.  Lying is a problem.  It is a moral 
problem.  It is, in a certain sense, caused by the failure of certain neurons to 
fire (let’s just say this is true).  But the problem with lying is not that the 
wrong neurons are firing.  One would not attempt to cure a liar by giving 
her a pill that triggers neurons of restraint; in all but the bizarre, pathologi-
cal case, this would be a very peculiar treatment of the problem.  Such a 
response would fail to recognize the problem as a moral one.  Instead of 
transforming immoral behavior into moral conduct, it would deprive the 
person of her moral agency and thereby mask the (im)moral dimension of 
lying.  By contrast, if someone has a neurological disorder that causes the 
right arm to go up when she wants to lift her left arm, then correcting the 
firing of neurons might very well be the right and obvious response. 
Bargaining power inequality causes moral problems with contract out-
comes in the same sense that neuron misfiring may cause lying.  It is the 
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mechanism by which underlying characteristics of the labor market and 
broader political economy are expressed in individual economic outcomes.  
We lack the conceptual resources to characterize individual outcomes as fair 
or unfair, let alone just or unjust, if we look no further than the bargaining 
process.  By attributing unappealing outcomes directly, or ultimately, to 
bargaining power inequality, we obscure the justice or injustice, i.e., the 
moral properties, of background institutions.  On the other hand, bargaining 
power inequality may relate to inefficient contract design in the same way 
that the misfiring of neurons relates to a medically cognizable neurological 
condition. 
To be sure, the analogy is not precise.  Notably, truth serums might 
exist, but there is no way to level bargaining power and thereby diffuse the 
moral choice present in the shape of social institutions.  The point is that 
even if bargaining power is the immediate, micro-level cause of the condi-
tion that we are ultimately concerned with, it is not the problem per se.  My 
point is not that we ought not to solve the problem of status by correcting 
bargaining power inequality, but that such a misdiagnosis affords no cohe-
rent, constructive response.  The problems associated with limited re-
sources, limited leisure, and a constricted daily routine are not intelligible as 
problems in light of bargaining power alone.  If it were possible to correct 
the status inequality by somehow addressing bargaining inequality, it would 
be an option worth considering, but since that is not practical, it does not 
make sense to continue to focus exclusively on bargaining power.  More to 
the point, the measures we can take to remedy the ills associated with low 
status cannot be coherently justified on the basis of bargaining power alone.  
Thus, focus on the concept of bargaining power ends up doing more harm 
than good. 
II.  REASONS TO SUPPORT A SYSTEMIC BELIEF IN STATUS EQUALITY 
It may appear unnecessary—or rhetorically manipulative—to argue 
that we should take into account a truth.  Before I address the specific rea-
sons we might have to ignore status inequality in contract, and before I 
show why they should be rejected, it is worth pausing to acknowledge that 
there are good reasons, especially in law, why we might sometimes proceed 
as though something is the case even when we have strong grounds for 
doubting it.  In fact, the best arguments against taking status inequality into 
account in contract and labor law may have less to do with the unavoidable 
economic cost of doing so than the principled desire not to frame legal ques-
tions in a manner that assumes and thereby risks legitimating and perhaps 
petrifying injustice. 
I have previously argued that deliberative autonomy is a moral prin-
ciple that constrains governance in a democratic society, irrespective of 
empirical facts regarding the level of deliberation and choice actually 
596 Michigan State Law Review [Vol. 2009:579 
present.  Equality too is a regulative principle that, for example, may con-
strain governmental use of statistics or other facts, which themselves stem 
from existing injustice, for certain purposes.43 
The regulatory presumption of equality usually comes into effect to 
protect the interests of the weak.  For example, where social institutions are 
incompatible with moral equality, the fact of, or facts arising from, social 
inequality may not be employed as grounds for policy that would perpetuate 
or worsen that inequality.  As the purpose of their adoption in law is to ad-
vance moral ends, regulative principles do not bar reforms that are them-
selves morally motivated.  Thus, if the background fact of status inequality 
were incorporated into the law as part of a redistributive program, a broad 
regulative principle of equality would not be an obstacle. 
Still another systemic objection could be raised to the acknowledg-
ment of status inequality.  A liberal state has reason to respect the values of 
its citizens.  That is, it has reason to acknowledge value in practices and 
institutions by virtue of those things being valued, without regard for 
whether those practices or institutions have objective value (or, without 
attempting to ascertain whether they do).  In particular, relationships that 
most individuals in a given society find valuable in their lives, or even rela-
tionships that individuals claim to find valuable, are prima facie worth pro-
tecting.  For example, familial relationships or even friendships may be giv-
en weight in government policy without state actors deciding independently 
that family and friendship comprise the good life.  Even where the value of 
certain kinds of family relationships appears doubtful to others, we are (and 
should be) reluctant to override the self-understanding of participants in the 
practice.  Similarly, if employers and employees value the employment rela-
tionship as one based on fundamental equality, liberals should be reluctant 
to override that self-understanding on a theory of false consciousness. 
  
 43. As I noted previously: 
A regulative principle is an assumption about the world that . . . [may or may not] 
correspond to empirical reality[,] . . . but which we justifiably regard as true for 
other reasons.  Regulative principles do not derive strictly from the nature of their 
apparent object.  For example, in the case of deliberative autonomy, the content of 
the principle does not derive from the quality of our cognitive capacities.  Because 
regulative principles are adopted instrumentally—either necessarily because they 
are the only means by which to attain necessary (i.e. moral) ends, or because they 
are the best means of advancing cognitive inquiry—their value does not hinge on 
their manifestation in the world of mechanical causality.   
Aditi Bagchi, Deliberative Autonomy and Legitimate State Purpose Under the First Amend-
ment, 68 ALB. L. REV. 815, 857-58 (2005).  If normative principles like autonomy and 
equality are understood as regulative principles, their apparent conflict with positive autono-
my or positive equality “‘is not a true conflict.’  It is ‘merely a different interest of reason 
that causes a divorce between ways of thinking.’”  Id. at 858 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, 
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 603 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood trans. & eds., 1998)). 
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The question is really whether employees and their employers under-
stand employment in this way.  Popular culture offers much evidence that 
individuals perceive family and friendship as supplying much of what is 
good and valuable in their lives.44  I doubt that we can have like confidence 
in the role of employment relationships.  While lateral relationships in the 
workplace are important, the overwhelming fact of status inequality stem-
ming from employment is commonplace in our culture.  The small tyrannies 
of the ordinary employment experience and the vagaries of the labor market 
are much more important to people’s experience of employment than the 
oft-romanticized relationships that a few employees have with their small 
business or individual employers.45  While a self-understanding of equality 
would indeed be a compelling reason to disregard the sharp social hierarchy 
in which most employees and employers are situated, cultural understand-
ings of the employment relation do not buttress but only make more pecu-
liar contract law’s stubborn blindness to status. 
There are more specific reasons why we might have to presume equal-
ity, or ignore status inequality, between employers and employees.  The 
presumption might be normatively useful in other ways.  First, reintroduc-
ing status into contract would appear to reverse the liberal developments in 
the nineteenth- and early twentieth- centuries that moved us from feudal to 
free labor.  Second, to the extent contract is animated by moral principles of 
promise, and to the extent status does not and should not bear on the quality 
of promise, there is no room for status in contract law.  Third, employees 
and employers do not stand in any consistent status relation (status inequali-
ty varies considerably in magnitude and character), and it may be prohibi-
tively expensive to tailor the rules of contract to individual employment 
relations.  Fourth, should we forego tailoring and regulate on the basis of 
broadly applicable mandatory terms, the resulting contracts will often be 
Pareto inferior, in that many workers will prefer a contract without the man-
datory term.  I consider these reasons in turn. 
A. Back to Status? 
Initial disdain for the idea of adjusting contractual liability to favor 
employees of low economic status may be rooted in the standard account of 
  
 44. A difficult intuition to prove empirically, one might look to the subject matter of 
feel-good sitcoms as indicative of what people are interested in seeing for light entertain-
ment: Most top sitcoms revolve around friendships and family life.  Work-life is mined for 
its absurdities.  See The Top Tens: The Top Ten Sitcoms of All Time, http://www.the-top-
tens.com/lists/the-top-ten-sitcoms-of-all-time.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).   
 45. Surveys confirm that people rank socializing with friends as among the most 
enjoyable things to do, while facing one’s boss ranks as among the least pleasant.  Benedict 
Carey, TV Time, Unlike Child Care, Ranks High in Mood Study, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at 
A22. 
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the movement from status to free labor.  In his classic account, Henry Maine 
observed that it is not 
difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees 
those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Fami-
ly.  It is Contract.  Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of 
society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Fam-
ily, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all 
these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals. . . .   
All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were derived 
from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently 
residing in the Family.  If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the 
best writers, to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term 
to such conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say 
that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from 
Status to Contract.46 
Status, then, represents the inglorious past in which the terms of relations 
between individuals were set by familial institutions rather than choices 
made by the individuals involved.  Status is associated with unfreedom.  
Not just the requirement of consent, but also its dispositive role in contract, 
guard against a rigid social order imposed from above. 
There is a basic problem with this picture.  As Robert Steinfeld has 
demonstrated, free consent to an employment model is compatible with a 
range of employment relations, including models which we would now re-
gard as decidedly unfree, such as indentured servitude.47  A society in which 
a large portion of the working population is, at any given time, in a highly 
dependent, radically hierarchical economic relationship that, in turn, con-
stricts their relations with others is surely one we would characterize by 
status.  But such a society was compatible with early American understand-
ings of the employment relation. 
Courts interpreted freely entered employment relationships along two 
quite distinct lines, both of which entrenched status even as they paid ho-
mage to free choice.  Some courts, in some instances, construed the sale of 
labor “as a form of lease giving the lessee (employer) the enforceable legal 
right to possession and control of the leased ‘property’ for the term of the 
lease.”48  Others constructed the transaction along entirely contractual lines 
in which delineated obligations were undertaken, albeit subject to “specific 
performance and even criminal penalties” upon breach.49  As Steinfeld ar-
gues: 
  
 46. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 169-70 (14th ed. 1984) (1861). 
 47. ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE 1350-1870 5 (1991). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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The core assumptions of individualist market society—that the social universe is 
composed of numerous, independent individuals all of whom have a natural prop-
erty in their own persons and all of whom are naturally disposed to exchange their 
goods with one another—leave ample scope for different legal and social specifica-
tions of what the sale of labor by one individual to another will entail.50   
Indeed, three notorious nineteenth-century doctrines in the area of em-
ployment contract could each be compatible with respecting the bargains 
freely struck by employees and employers.  But each reinforced what were 
effectively status-based employment relations in the period.  First, the “en-
tire contract doctrine” prevented employees from collecting for partial com-
pletion of an employment contract.51  If an employee entered a service con-
tract for one year, for example, but quit in the tenth month, she would not be 
entitled to any remuneration.  This is consistent with general contract prin-
ciples, since however substantial her performance, her failure to complete 
was willful.  Of course, the rule rendered employees in a subsistence econ-
omy immobile for extended periods, and created an incentive for employers 
to extract increasing amount of labor or otherwise make working conditions 
unbearable toward the end of the contract, since early departure by the em-
ployee would result in a windfall to the employer.  But it is not difficult to 
construct the hypothetical bargain in which an employee would specifically 
agree to such an arrangement. 
Second, the assumption of employer control gave the employer wide 
latitude over the worker during the purchased labor time, including matters 
likely not contemplated at the time of initial contract.52  But again, wide 
discretion—still wider than commonly assumed in the contemporary land-
scape—is something that an employee could in principle freely accept.  The 
resulting relationships would nevertheless be characterized as status-based 
relationships. 
Finally, the early law of workplace accidents was highly unfavorable 
to employees, denying them recovery for even those injuries arising in the 
  
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. (1 Pick.) 267, 267-68, 276 (1824); Faxon v. 
Mansfield, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 147, 147-48 (1806). 
 52. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Toale, 25 S.C. 238, 243 (1886) (‘“The servant is bound to 
obey all the master’s lawful and reasonable commands, even though such commands may, 
under the circumstances, seem harsh and severe, but the master has a right to manage his 
own affairs, and it must be a very extreme case in which a servant would be justified in re-
fusing obedience to his orders.’”) (citation omitted).  To this day, employees owe their em-
ployers a fiduciary duty that “prohibits him from ‘acting in any manner inconsistent with his 
agency or trust,’ and he is ‘at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in 
the performance of his duties.’”  Gortat v. Capala Bros., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Lamdin v. Broadway Surface Adver. Corp., 5 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 
1936)). 
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ordinary course of employment.53  But again, it would not be shocking—
even if arguably inefficient—were workers to freely assume the risk of such 
accidents.  The resulting vulnerability of the employee and indifference of 
the employer would be shocking, and would accent the status difference 
between them. 
John Witt points out that each of these doctrines represents a default 
rule around which employees and employers could have contracted.  He 
argues that it was not the pro-employer defaults that mattered so much as 
the host of complex rules that “allocated bargaining power [between] em-
ployers and employees, such as the law of labor combinations, duress, and 
fraud,” which together with costly enforcement mechanisms made it diffi-
cult for employees to contract around default rules and enforce those devia-
tions if won.54  But many of the defects in the bargaining process Witt iden-
tifies are characteristic of contemporary employment relations.  We do not 
think because employers are more likely to be repeated players familiar with 
complex and sometimes inconsistent law, and have the resources to enforce 
it, that employees have not agreed to the contracts that they may only dimly 
perceive.  The specific employee disadvantages Witt describes helped rein-
force employee status; they do not undermine status as an appropriate lens 
through which to view the resulting relations. 
The lesson from this historical excursion is that what we recognize as 
status is not limited to the extreme case where the law directly enforces feu-
dalism.  Law that is formally committed to respecting the free choices of 
employees may nevertheless, through pro-employer defaults as well as more 
subtle features such as cost, inconsistency, and evidentiary rules, effectively 
reinforce status.  The risk of too formal an approach to contract has long 
been recognized.  Friedrich Kessler warned that standard contracts could 
“become effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and 
commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their 
own making upon a vast host of vassals.”55  He found the “spectacle” espe-
cially “fascinating” because it was contract ideology that was used a century 
before “to break down the last vestiges of a patriarchal and benevolent 
feudal order in the field of master and servant.”56  This earlier social service 
performed by contract law facilitated “the return back from contract to sta-
tus which we experience today” because “the belief in freedom of contract 
  
 53. See, e.g., Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 49, 49 (1842); 
Atchison & E. Bridge Co. v. Miller, 80 P. 18, 29 (Kan. 1905). 
 54. See John Fabian Witt, Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract, 
Again, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 627, 638 (2000). 
 55. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943). 
 56. Id. at 640-41.  
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has remained one of the firmest axioms in the whole fabric of the social 
philosophy of our culture.”57  Similarly, Neil Chamberlain observed that:  
Probably because of its contrast with status, in the Maine tradition, “contract” has 
become something of a sacred cow, and any attack upon it or any derogation of its 
sufficiency is likely to be eyed askance, as suggesting a return to feudalism or evi-
dencing an insensitiveness to totalitarian systems of vassalage.58   
But he too rejected this attitude arguing that not only non-contractual rela-
tionships should be associated with class or occupational status; within the 
class of contractual relationships, there was plenty of variety—and room for 
status.59 
The primary postwar response to the persistence of status within a 
contract-based regime of free labor was the welfare state.  Manfred Reh-
binder defended the “socialization of private law” as acknowledging that the 
“freedom of the individual is not only a question of legal structure, but also 
a question of concrete economic order, especially of the distribution of 
goods.”60  But this “socialization of private law” was in fact the generation 
of a new body of public law that would reign in and provide a new backdrop 
to private law.  The movement to finish what formal contract law could not 
was a political one, and the common law of contract was—though admitted-
ly reformed, reshaped, squeezed-in—not the primary object.61 
Nor was the revision of the socioeconomic environment in which em-
ployment relationships are now embedded, however dramatic it was, suffi-
cient to eliminate the dependency and radical hierarchy characteristic of a 
status regime.  Thus, fears that taking into account status in the law will 
thrust us back to a prior era are misplaced.  Just as we have used not just 
(relatively) frank discussion of race but also legal tools such as affirmative 
  
 57. Id. at 641.   
 58. Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 
COLUM. L. REV. 829, 834 (1948). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Manfred Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 
941, 946 (1971).   
 61. See Herbert D. Laube, The Defaulting Employee—Britton v. Turner Re-viewed, 
83 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 847 (1935) (describing a change in the “political center of gravity”); 
Barry J. Reiter, The Control of Contract Power, 1 O.J.L.S. 347, 352 (1981) (“Ultimately, 
‘the market’ turns out to have been a short term bridge philosophy carrying society from a 
period of organization in religious and feudal terms to the modern era of democratic political 
direction.”); see also R. H. Graveson, The Movement from Status to Contract, 4 MOD. L. 
REV. 261, 272 (1941) (“Maine believed that the movement from status to contract was cha-
racteristic of progressive societies.  The further movement from contract to status may cha-
racterise a social retrogression or a movement to a plane of legal progress higher than Maine 
conceived.  The history and spirit of the Common Law give every assurance that the second 
possibility embodies the future of our legal system.”). 
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action to reign in the insidious effects of a race-based social structure,62 so 
too can we use the concept of status to begin to reign in and remedy disturb-
ing and pervasive features of the all-important employment relationship.  
The rhetoric of universal free will, however optimistically cast in opposition 
to status-based privilege, has been inadequate.  
B. Narrow Corrective Justice 
Status inequality might be misplaced in the language of contract if the 
field were fully occupied by a normative principle such as corrective justice.  
While it is unlikely that actors within the legal system self-consciously ever 
adopted will-based theories of contract in order to displace social issues, 
Morton Horwitz has argued that “the will theory of contract was part of a 
more general process whereby courts came to reflect commercial inter-
ests.”63  Apart from any political economic pressures that industrialization 
placed on the legal system, Horwitz suggests that both the rise of commerce 
and the rise of will theory were related to a rejection of the theory of objec-
tive value that underpinned the equitable idea of contract.64  A newfound 
belief in the incommensurable desires of the individual translated into a 
reluctance to second-guess the arrangements struck by free individuals—
laissez-faire ideology.65 
Even today, advocates of a formal approach to contract insist that “the 
law of contract [must] presuppose[] that people are, at least sometimes, au-
tonomous agents who are capable of making their own decisions about 
when to contract and on what terms.”66  Quoting a contemporary, Kessler 
observed that:  
[C]ourts are extremely hesitant to declare contracts void as against public policy 
“because if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is 
that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
  
 62. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (recognizing diversity, 
or specifically, efforts to include historically disadvantaged groups and thereby undermine 
racial stereotypes, as a compelling state interest); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (allowing affirmative action to correct for past discrimination in mar-
ket).  But see generally Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and 
Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (exploring history of resistance to 
acknowledging and affirmatively reacting to social fact of race).  
 63. Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 917, 953 (1974). 
 64. Id. at 947. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Hamish Stewart, A Formal Approach to Contractual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 175, 206 (1997). 
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contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall 
be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice.”67 
The earlier emphasis on will alone did not easily accommodate atten-
tion to the facts that might condition exercise of the will.  But there is more 
conceptual room for status in contemporary philosophical accounts of con-
tract, which emphasize the assumption of voluntary obligation as the dis-
tinctive mark of contract.  While corrective justice theories of contract vary, 
they now usually stem from a commitment to enforcing or at least support-
ing the moral practice of promise.  In the United States today, theories of 
promise are more important to lawyers, judges, and perhaps lay persons’ 
understanding of what animates contractual obligation than giving effect to 
a contracting party’s will independent of any obligation or right it might 
create with respect to the other party.   
Whatever the merits of a promissory view of contract, it fails inas-
much as it claims (and it rarely does68) that the bare fact of promise fully 
determines the scope of responsibility arising from voluntary transactions 
between individuals.  Most theories of promise acknowledge that the con-
tent of the promissory obligation will turn on background norms.69  These 
norms, i.e., the content of promise, will differ depending on the nature of 
the relationship within which a promise is made.  Moreover, since the prac-
tice is valuable because it supports certain kinds of valuable relationships,70 
its value depends in turn on the kinds of relationships within which it is 
situated.  We might use contract to support some relations—including cer-
tain kinds of employment relations—but not others.  
Another of the values associated with promising is the capacity 
created by the practice to obligate one’s future self and thereby create and 
  
 67. Kessler, supra note 55, at 630-31 (quoting Printing & Numerical Registering Co. 
v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875)). 
 68. But see Spencer Nathan Thal, The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: 
The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness, 8 O.J.L.S. 17, 24 (1988) (“[T]he only way 
to define unfairness is by focusing on the bargaining process and not the outcome.”).  Thal 
argues that:  
The act of bargaining reflects on the sanctity of the promise which follows, and so 
it is the act of bargaining, and not the act of promising, which is the foundation for 
the freedom of contract doctrine, and specifically the notion that if you make a 
bargain you should be held to it. 
Id. at 27. 
 69. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 17 (1981) (“There exists a convention that defines the practice of promising and 
its entailments.”). 
 70. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1420 
(2004) (“[P]romises generally, and contracts in particular, establish a relation of recognition 
and respect—and indeed a kind of community—among those who participate in them, and I 
explain the reasons that exist for making and for keeping promises and contracts in terms of 
the value of this relation.”). 
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express a morally continuous self.  But even this aspect of contract is in 
question under certain circumstances, such as those described by Gillian 
Hadfield, where the promisor simply does not view the promise as future-
directed.71  Under conditions of stark inequality, rejection of present cir-
cumstances and undue optimism over future circumstances might under-
mine this “linking” function.  It would be perverse to hold employees to 
earlier promises (sometimes only implicit) in order to empower them to 
extend and cultivate their personal identities if those aspects of their identity 
most relevant to the contracts at issue are ones they would happily escape. 
The content and value of promise will also vary depending on whether 
the parties already owe each other something, whether the promise is aimed 
at creating trust or profit, whether and how the parties value their relations 
to one another, and how similarly situated parties behave.72  One need not 
deny the place of individual responsibility as a normative anchor in private 
law to appreciate that its content and scope will be conditioned on social 
facts, starting with the language used by the parties and including the social 
inequalities which frame their interaction.  The fact of status inequality can 
be integrated into a more complete account of what individuals owe each 
other in private law.   
Moreover, as Richard Craswell pointed out, much of the force of 
promissory theory is directed toward explaining the force of contractual 
obligation and not toward defending particular default rules which may be 
contracted around by the parties.73  In principle, one might take the position 
that the content and scope of obligations in a given contract is fully deter-
mined by the parties’ intentions, and that the content of those intentions, 
even when constructed out of background practices, is an empirical rather 
than a normative question.74  But no one has ever proposed that courts set 
about resolving contractual uncertainties in this way.  Instead, courts use 
interpretative defaults to supply meaning where the easily accessible facts 
of a case do not settle it.  If set as majoritarian defaults, those rules will re-
quire constructing hypothetical bargains, and the specifications of those 
  
 71. See Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist 
Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
1235, 1255 (1998) (“‘She chose’ does not distinguish, fundamentally, between choice among 
present alternatives and choice over the future.”). 
 72. Cf. Wojciech Sadurski, Social Justice and Legal Justice, 3 LAW & PHIL. 329, 
337 (1984).  Sadurski argues that the value of promise will depend at least in part on whether 
its content is just.  Id. 
 73. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promis-
ing, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489-90 (1989). 
 74. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125 (1976) (observing that if courts had “followed [through on] the 
teachings of pure contract theory, . . . the duration of hiring and the notice required would 
have been open questions in each case to be decided without presumptions of either yearly 
hiring or termination at will”). 
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hypotheticals will be normatively laden.  If set as punitive defaults, we 
might use these defaults to motivate either employers or employees to re-
veal information to the other.  In either case, we must choose ends toward 
which the default rules will be employed, and principles of corrective jus-
tice will not always supply these ends.75  The mitigation of status inequality 
is one such compatible end. 
C. Cost of Tailored Rules 
The two remaining objections to status-based interventions in em-
ployment contracts are of a decidedly different flavor than those discussed 
thus far.  Arguing that it is too costly to tailor status-interventions in the 
form of either default rules or mandatory terms to the myriad of different 
employment relations appeals to welfarist concerns.  The idea is that even if 
status-interventions were otherwise justified, they should not be undertaken 
because of other negative effects. 
One must start out in this context by conceding that status-based inter-
ventions in the employment relationship, like interventions justified on oth-
er grounds, are likely to exact some economic cost.  The aggregate wealth 
created by employment contracts will likely be less, since the flexibility that 
is a comparative advantage of the U.S. labor regime makes it possible for 
firms to allocate their resources more efficiently, and to reallocate them 
more quickly, than were those choices constrained by rigid employment 
rules.76  Moreover, it is worth pointing out that some other countries that 
have highly regulated labor markets have attempted to reform those markets 
so as to afford greater flexibility to firms.77  All that said, there is a huge 
space within which to make trade-offs between wealth and redistribution.  
Neither is a dispositive retort to the other since absolute priority to either 
would lead us down a slippery slope to a deeply unattractive society. 
The more interesting variation of the welfarist’s objection sounds in 
futility: attempting to implement any rule that will effectively alter the terms 
ultimately governing employment relations will be unsuccessful because 
  
 75. See Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The 
Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 431-34 (2001) (discussing doctrinal inde-
terminacy of autonomy-based theories of contract). 
 76. See Alejandro Cuñat & Marc J. Melitz, Volatility, Labor Market Flexibility, and 
the Pattern of Comparative Advantage, at 23 tbl.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13062, 2007), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~mmelitz/papers/acmm_07_ 
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Kong and Singapore are more flexible)).  Countries with more flexible labor markets exploit 
that comparative advantage by specializing in volatile industries.  Id. at 20. 
 77. Kathleen Thelen, Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies, in 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
71, 72 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
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appropriately tailoring rules is so prohibitively costly that courts, and even 
legislatures, will consistently get it wrong.78  The result would be nurses 
subject to rules better suited to carpenters, and machinists subject to rules 
better suited to daycare workers.  In part because we have thus far so syste-
matically eschewed the categorization of jobs and sectors, the prospect of 
setting notice periods or financially feasible leave policies across firms and 
sectors is daunting indeed.  
The objection here is a path-dependent one, for a legal system already 
well versed in variations across sectors and job classifications would be far 
less likely to systematically impose Pareto-inferior moves.  The good news 
is that while the common law of contract has moved at a snail’s pace in its 
employment-related reforms, the surrounding administrative state has ex-
ploded since the days of classical theory.  The National Labor Relations Act 
regime already makes a number of critical distinctions relevant to status-
based interventions, including the preliminary distinction between supervi-
sory and non-supervisory employees.  Other agencies, like the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, also possess a wealth of information re-
garding industry practices.  It is possible to develop not only tailored rules, 
but common-law-style (but actually statutory or administrative) standards to 
guide application of doctrines, which turn on facts that vary considerably.  
The futility point is really a feasibility point, and, therefore, contingent on 
the administrative capacities of agencies.  Administrative agencies today 
already develop and administer a wide range of regulation that is reasonably 
sensitive to variance across employment contexts. 
Nevertheless, it is probably true that however improved our capacity 
to develop tailored contractual defaults in the employment context, it is un-
likely that these terms are those that would have been adopted had they been 
negotiated by the parties themselves.  Our purpose would not be wholly 
defeated, however, even if parties contracted around new legal defaults such 
that the resulting bargains were to mirror precisely typical contracts prior to 
enactment of the reform.  To be sure, if parties contract around these de-
faults, they will expend resources in negotiating around them that come out 
of the surplus generated by the employment contract.79  Those costs 
represent a dead-weight loss, and would not be associated with a more 
equitable distribution of the surplus in those transactions.  However, there 
  
 78. See Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 372 
(2004) (“[C]ontract law rules are created either by courts or by private law reform groups, 
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contracts.”). 
 79. Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 94 n.4 (2003); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 99 (7th ed. 2007). 
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would be some ethical “payoff” even in these transactions inasmuch as the 
additional, and admittedly costly, negotiations force clarity upon the em-
ployment relation.  That is, the information divulged has value that we 
would not normally count as part of the transactional surplus.  It is difficult 
to assess this value against the lost surplus. 
The other important advantage of these defaults is cumulative.  There 
will be some employment contracts whose terms will differ as a result of the 
defaults.  In some cases, the costs of transacting around the defaults will be 
prohibitive; in some cases, the costs will be prohibitive because one or both 
of the parties is uncertain as to the value she assigns to each of a number of 
possible substitute terms.  The fact that the resulting contracts will be more 
equitable along a single dimension may not be of cognizable value to a non-
paternalist if both parties would actually prefer a different term that, stand-
ing alone, is inferior for the employee.  However, because status is not gen-
erated by isolated contracts but arises from and is reinforced by patterned 
contracting, these repeated deviations from “optimal contracting” at the 
transactional level will disrupt and potentially undermine status as an insti-
tution. 
D. Pareto-inferior Mandatory Terms 
Many regulations are not tailored, and presumably some status-based 
contract interventions too would not be tailored but would take the form of 
sweeping mandatory terms.  Here, the welfarist objection sounds in irony: 
there is a risk that in attempting to mitigate the conditions faced by poorly 
situated employees, one makes their lives worse. 
This objection is a legitimate brake on excess.  But the balancing that 
is necessary in setting any mandatory term is demonstrably possible, and 
perhaps inevitable, as evidenced by the cyclical hand-wringing associated 
with the minimum wage.  The well-known risk associated with an excessive 
minimum wage is that it may result in higher unemployment or underem-
ployment as employers cut back on their purchase of labor at the higher 
price.80  With respect to mandatory terms like the minimum wage, political 
constraints make it unlikely that what is mandatory will be anything more 
than a low standard that caters to the most budget-constrained employers.  
Given the influence of employer groups like the Chamber of Commerce and 
their superior access to information regarding employers’ ability to pay 
  
 80. For a discussion of extensive and ongoing efforts to gauge the effects of a mini-
mum wage on employment, among other outcomes, see generally Christopher J. Flinn, Min-
imum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes Under Search, Matching, and Endogenous 
Contact Rates, 74 ECONOMETRICA 1013 (2006).  See also William E. Even & David A. Mac-
pherson, The Wage and Employment Dynamics of Minimum Wage Workers, 69 S. ECON. J. 
676 (2003). 
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higher wage rates, a risk-averse Congress is unlikely to pass legislation that 
might render large swaths of employees unemployable.   
The federal minimum wage cannot be set at a rate that is appropriate 
across the widely varying economic conditions of the country.  Since locali-
ties can deviate upward but not downward from its specified rate, Congress 
can be expected to settle for the least common denominator, i.e., a rate that 
is unlikely to set off dramatic employment losses in any particular sector or 
in any particular geographic region.  That rate will likely be too low to raise 
families out of poverty in some parts of the country, and it will be below the 
economic capacities of many firms in certain sectors, but it if it does not do 
as much good as possible, it is at least unlikely to do much harm.  The fact 
that the minimum is not tailored to industry or job classification likely re-
sults in a larger number of sectors and jobs for which the floor is lower than 
it should be than sectors in which it is higher than it should be.  The politics 
of mandatory terms, at least in a veto-ridden political process such as ours, 
promotes the virtue of moderation.81 
There are other types of mandatory terms which might appear syste-
matically welfare diminishing, but are not.  Terms that forcibly allocate 
some downside risk may appear inferior to the terms we would expect the 
parties to agree upon were they to allocate the risk between themselves and 
compensate the risk-bearer.  However, there is reason to believe that in the 
employment context the parties will systematically allocate risk poorly.  In 
particular, in many cases where employees usually bear the risk, it is likely 
to turn out that employers would usually bear the risk better. 
Often an employee will not know to demand price compensation 
where an employer’s traits are associated with above-average risk—the em-
ployee will be unaware of the relevant traits.  Even a punitive pro-employee 
default is unlikely to force useful information about the level of risk asso-
ciated with an employer because all employers will make the demand and 
the employee will not know how much compensation is appropriate from a 
given employer relative to other employers.  Often the risk to be allocated is 
a function of facts separately held by employer and employee, which neither 
has incentive to reveal, making it still more unlikely that a default favoring 
either side will result in the pooling of information necessary to motivate 
cooperative assignment of risk.82  Where one party lacks the informational 
  
 81. For a more in-depth discussion of the politics of the minimum wage, see Russell 
S. Sobel, Theory and Evidence on the Political Economy of the Minimum Wage, 107 J. POL. 
ECON. 761 (1999); André Blais et al., The Determinants of Minimum Wage Rates, 62 PUB. 
CHOICE 15 (1989). 
 82. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the 
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 763 (1992) (“The separation of market 
power and information between two contracting parties creates powerful incentives for stra-
tegic contractual behavior.”); Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on 
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resources to either bargain or effectively shop, there is no reason to believe 
that, in the absence of a mandatory term, parties will efficiently allocate 
risk.   
While the employer is in a better position to assess certain risks to the 
employee, she is not able to unilaterally, optimally allocate risk without 
relevant information from the employee.  Nor is the employer motivated to 
allocate risk optimally where the employee is unable to assess the value of 
relevant provisions and, often, could not exact a premium for bearing addi-
tional risk in any event.  The alternative to an admittedly hit-or-miss manda-
tory term is not optimal allocation of risk based on private information. 
E. Concrete Reforms Motivated by Status 
My arguments are intended to support the adoption of a range of poss-
ible status-based interventions, though I do not explore their individual me-
rits at length.  A few examples will clarify the scope and magnitude envi-
sioned. 
First, courts should interpret ambiguous or unstated policies with re-
spect to sick leave and vacation entitlements against the employer.  An em-
ployer who qualifies her statement of a policy with “usually” or “normally” 
would be held to that policy in the absence of clear exceptions.  But also, an 
employer who fails to state any policy in a given year may be held to past 
practice or to a general default, e.g., one day of paid vacation per forty-day 
work cycle.  A slightly more dramatic step would be to enact statutory paid 
vacation.83  It is possible that in many work settings this will have no effect 
on the actual amount of paid leisure time since employers would be able to 
pay employees to forfeit vacation days, perhaps at an overtime rate, and 
could also adjust wage rates accordingly.  It is quite likely, however, that 
altering statutory defaults would affect the combination of wages and paid 
leisure offered to many employees.   
The more modest proposal of enforcing ambiguous or unstated poli-
cies against employers will have a smaller effect, but may accustom both 
employers and employees to viewing paid vacation as a component of their 
compensation packages rather than as discretionary “gifts” imparted to em-
ployees to boost morale.  Notably, present law does provide for interpreting 
ambiguity in a written contract against its drafter (contra proferentem),84 but 
the rule is of limited applicability in the work context since most employees 
  
Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 381, 402 (1990) (showing 
that deceptive signaling may cause pooling around incorrect preference point). 
 83. Cf. Council Directive 93/104, art. 7, 1993 O.J. (L 307) 18-24.  
 84. 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 1999). 
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lack written contracts and, even where a contract exists, at present, silence 
with regard to vacation leave would not be interpreted as ambiguous. 
This proposed reform would alleviate status in a number of ways.  
First, the defaults are likely to result in an increase in either the amount of 
leisure available to employees or their financial compensation.  It is certain-
ly theoretically possible that employers will contract around defaults or pur-
chase back vacation time while adjusting base wages downward.  But the 
rule will express social expectations in a manner that may both alter em-
ployee preferences, prompt reflection over those preferences, and employer 
perceptions of labor market norms.  In addition, forcing clarity is of inde-
pendent value in restraining unbridled discretion on the part of employers 
over important aspects of employee quality of life.  It will facilitate life 
planning, enhancing the experience of control by individual employees at 
the expense of their employers.  There is of course still a variety of impor-
tant ways in which employees will remain at the mercy of employers, but 
such a salient, albeit limited, constraint on employers will reduce the expe-
rience of total control.  Employers will remain authorities in the workplace, 
but it will be clearer that their legitimate power lies in control over compen-
sation, not in the dispensing of gifts. 
A related reform would be to set pro-employee defaults regarding no-
tice of termination.85  For example, unless an employer has stated an alterna-
tive notice period (of as little as one day) both orally and in writing within 
the last six months, the default notice period should be construed as three 
weeks.  Many employers will choose to set a shorter notice period.  But 
requiring employers to specify this in advance will ensure that employees 
do not assume that some other notice period applies, either based on their 
flawed perception of common practice, common decency, common sense, 
or on their perceptions of their individual job situations.86  Moreover, requir-
ing employers to “renew” their opt-out on a regular basis will ensure that 
employees do not come to believe that the formal rule no longer applies to 
them due to long tenure or positive feedback they may have received since 
the last statement of the policy. 
  
 85. Under prevailing law (in all states but Montana), employment is presumed at-
will, and at-will employment requires neither cause for nor notice of termination on the part 
of either employee or employer.  See Joseph Z. Fleming, Labor and Employment Law: Re-
cent Developments—At-Will Termination of Employment Has Not Been Terminated, 20 
NOVA L. REV. 437, 437 (1995); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Die Kundigung, Licenciement, 
Recesso dal Contrato, ‘Firing’, or ‘Sacking’: Comparing European and American Laws on 
Management Prerogatives and Discretion in Termination Decisions, 18 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 19, 19 (2008) (describing U.S. law as anomalous for the absence of employee rights 
at termination). 
 86. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110-11, 131-
40 (1997) (examining employees’ false beliefs that they can be fired only for just cause). 
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This reform would deliver at least one of two benefits in the sphere of 
employment authority.  First, for employers willing to abide by the default 
or who provide for some notice period, it will reduce marginally the magni-
tude of the catastrophe employers have the power to inflict on their em-
ployees through termination.  To be sure, employees will not be indifferent 
to termination.  But there will be at least a small window of opportunity 
within which they might secure immediate employment elsewhere.87 
The second benefit is more subtle, but especially important with re-
spect to those employees whose employers choose to opt out of the default 
and refuse any obligation to provide notice.  These employees will be put on 
notice of something else: the nature of their employment relationship.  Em-
ployers incur an unholy benefit from employees’ false expectations and 
perceptions regarding their employment.  Inasmuch as they trust that their 
employer has their interests, among others, at heart and would not inflict 
sudden termination upon them, a periodic check on that confusion will in-
fuse self-preserving realism into employees’ attitudes.88  As employees are 
reminded that the employer is legitimately constrained not just to pursue but 
to prioritize purposes other than employee well-being, employees will order 
their employment-related objectives accordingly. 
Another reform that an honest look at status could motivate is a policy 
of enforcing ostensibly nonbinding commitments by employers in the ab-
sence of documented agreement that the commitment was nonbinding.  Em-
ployers frequently promise promotions, additional time off, bonuses, and 
other improvements to employees.  Sometimes the promise is expressly 
nonbinding; at other times, there is no reference made to the legal status of 
the promise.  Rarely are such promises made in direct and formal exchange 
for some additional performance or task by the employee.  Instead, the 
promise is “planted” in order to induce some behavior, but there is no en-
forceable contract.  I have argued elsewhere in favor of enforcing promises 
made by employers to employees in the absence of written documentation 
  
 87. See Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for 
Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 135, 158 (2006) (ar-
guing for at-will-with-notice, and observing the various benefits employees derive from 
advance notice of termination). 
 88. But see Ben-Shahar, supra note 13, at 412-13.  Ben-Shahar suggests that one of 
the advantages of default rules favoring the more powerful contracting party is that the 
weaker party can avoid the psychic costs of having the unfavorable distributive character of 
the contract spelled out openly.  Id.  From a utility-maximizing standpoint, this indeed has 
value, and it is beyond the scope of this Essay to defeat a utility-oriented approach in favor of 
a deontological one.  But as a general matter, we should be wary of benefits secured by way 
of Noble Lies.  More particularly, disguising or simply ignoring status inequalities between 
contracting parties only enables and reinforces status hierarchies. 
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that the promise is not binding.89  It costs little to document the nonbinding-
ness of these promises, but it will ensure that employers are not able to ex-
tract more from employees than the true nature of the employer’s commit-
ment, i.e., the probability of the employer’s performance, warrants.  Of 
course, the enforcement of employer promises would not normally entail 
specific performance; as in other contractual settings, expectation damages 
would be the norm.  But the replacement of a paternalistic regime of private 
promise with the formality of contract will inject, or perhaps uncover, a 
healthy quid-pro-quo dynamic in the employment relation.  The benefits 
employers confer on their employees are neither gift nor reward: they are 
compensation to which employees are entitled.  Legal recognition of that 
entitlement would be empowering. 
A final concrete reform would be to move further toward judicial de-
ference only for arbitration proceedings that comply with judicially or statu-
torily determined standards.90  There has already been much discussion 
about the problem of arbitration provisions in employment agreements, of 
which employees are often only dimly aware at the time they begin em-
ployment.91  In fact, a bill that would render unenforceable mandatory arbi-
tration provisions in employment and consumer contracts, the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009, has been introduced after a similar bill failed to pass 
in earlier sessions.92  Even with a Democratic Congress and President, it 
seems unlikely that a bill that would so drastically alter the employment law 
landscape will actually become law in the near future. 
However, courts already refuse to defer to panels composed entirely of 
persons selected by the employer, and there is discussion regarding the ap-
  
 89. See Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise (U. Penn. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-35, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1012150 (on file with author). 
 90. At present, mandatory arbitration provisions are usually enforced.  See Michael 
Newman & Faith Isenhath, Two Trends in Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal 
Courts, 55 FED. LAW. 14, 14 (July 2008) (describing “the recent inclusion of (and the federal 
courts’ willingness to uphold) arbitration provisions in employment agreements”). 
 91. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kanga-
roo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (2007); David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping 
Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 
(2003); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 33 (1997); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against En-
forcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 
UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996).  But see Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why 
It’s Better than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783 (2008). 
 92. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).  This 
bill was modeled after the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 110th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). 
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propriate level and distribution of arbitration costs.93  But notwithstanding 
guidelines regarding uniform standards for arbitration proceedings,94 courts 
have yet to converge on a single set of procedural protections, and the Su-
preme Court in particular seems wary of imposing restrictions on a process 
that is an attractive alternative to costly judicial proceedings and to which 
many employees have in fact consented to as a formal contractual matter.95 
Whether it is preferable to disallow mandatory arbitration provisions 
in employment contracts, to restrict their use to certain kinds of claims (e.g., 
contract-based but not statutory claims), or to enforce them subject to cer-
tain basic and uniform procedural protections is an empirical question that 
turns on data about the kinds of claims normally arbitrated and relative costs 
and rates of success in arbitration as compared to in court.  It is a question 
that cannot be answered here.  The last reform, the adoption of a consistent 
and clear standard of due process, is the most modest and most feasible.  
But even it will deliver substantial benefits to employees.  Some benefits are 
material and obvious: certain employees will not lose legitimate claims that 
would otherwise have been thwarted by biased and uninformed arbitrators.  
Improved procedural protections that result in more predictable compensa-
tion and termination will enhance employees’ financial security. 
Predictability would improve because employers would be more con-
strained in their exercise of discretion.  This is perhaps the more meaningful 
sense in which due process in arbitration would empower employees.  For 
even those employees lucky enough to have an employment contract, em-
ployers will feel no restraint in their dealings if they have full confidence 
that they can get away with unfair treatment, even in violation of the con-
tract by way of rigged arbitration.  From the employee perspective, going 
through the gestures of contract only to learn from coworkers’ experiences 
that the contract fails to meaningfully bind one’s employer is in a way 
worse than operating outside of contract altogether, for it suggests that ef-
  
 93. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999); 
McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2004); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 94. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE 
OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (“DUNLOP COMMISSION”), REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 118-19 (Dec. 1994); TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 
OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), reprinted 
in 9A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 534:401 (1996). 
 95. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (enforcing 
arbitration of age discrimination claim); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 
79, 90-92 (2000) (enforcing arbitration of consumer financing contract); see also Metro E. 
Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 
2002) (enforcing arbitration of telephone company’s tariff).   
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fective legal protection cannot even be purchased.96  Outrage at the selective 
use by some employers of biased arbitration to rid themselves of statutory 
claims does not stem from the intuition that statutorily protected interests 
are more important to individual employees than contractual claims; the 
latter may affect bread-and-butter issues like pay.  That outrage is inspired 
at least in part from the effect on the employment relation of the unbridled 
employer power that manipulable arbitration provisions create.  If employ-
ers are permitted to use biased arbitration procedures to evade even those 
basic background checks on employer power imposed by law, the resulting 
situation of unchecked authority magnifies the disempowerment associated 
with low status.  More consistent regulation of arbitration proceedings 
would invigorate existing contractual and statutory restraints on employer 
discretion. 
These reforms are mere examples of interventions in the employment 
relation that could mitigate status.  One could argue for each of these re-
forms on alternative grounds; for example, one might view them as correc-
tions for various market failures traceable to information asymmetry or high 
transaction costs, or as antidotes to a disparity in bargaining power.  I have 
argued that we can best understand the normative impulse behind them 
through the lens of status.  These reforms will not perfect any labor market 
process or bargaining procedure; indeed, there are no criteria by which we 
could characterize such perfection without reference to the normative aims 
of those processes.  But if we can recognize that rigid status hierarchies 
have negative normative value, reforms such as those discussed here may be 
motivated directly by the mitigation of status. 
III.  THE PARADOX OF THE EQUALITY ASSUMPTION IN COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
If the myth of equality in the individual employment relation is sur-
prising, it is still more peculiar in the context of collective bargaining.  The 
Northern labor movement, which pushed for state and federal legislation 
that would protect unions and facilitate collective bargaining, never ac-
cepted the myth that literal freedom of contract in an open labor market 
amounted to equality.  Indeed, the labor movement and leading abolitionists 
  
 96. While the condition of vulnerability may not be new, the conclusion that it can-
not be avoided is all the more bitter in light of our gradually acquired public understanding of 
the employment relation as a contractual one between legal equals.  See Jonathan Simon, For 
the Government of Its Servants: Law and Disciplinary Power in the Work Place, 1870-1906, 
13 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y. 105, 107 (1993) (“The law provided authoritative representations 
through which participants interpreted their world and their place in it: how employment 
relations worked, to what extent they were alterable, to what extent they were justifiable. . . . 
A world increasingly shaped by the disciplinary power of managers was made to appear as 
one governed by the mutual sovereignty of contracting parties.” (citation omitted)). 
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regarded one another with mutual suspicion.97  Abolitionists viewed free 
labor as unequivocally free; they described it as voluntary even while ac-
knowledging a worker’s absolute dependence on his employer.98  But work-
ers saw unions as not only a means toward better wages and working condi-
tions, but also as instruments of workplace governance and a gradual 
movement from submission to self-assertion.99 
Despite that clarity of ultimate purpose on the part of some, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) regime has been constructed as if only 
an even legal playing field were necessary to secure social justice.100  If 
workers voluntarily form a union, then the union and the employer are in-
vited to reach a voluntary agreement.101  Because the Act conceives of col-
lective bargaining as analogous to individual contracting, with the same 
implications for liberty and thus for democracy itself, we are loath to prod 
or impose too much.102  This approach reflects, in part, salient policy goals 
and the political climate during the formative legislative period.  It is also 
the product of uncertainty at that time with respect to the future balance of 
power between unions and employers, and a risk-averse strategy on the part 
  
 97. William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the 
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 784 (1985). 
 98. See ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 67 
(1980).   
 99. See Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. 
REV. 999, 1002-03 (1955) (“Addition of the union alters the situation in at least two ways: 
First, the employees, through the union, must participate in the determinations.  Second, the 
acceptance of unions and collective bargaining has increased the employee’s confidence and 
his sense of dignity and importance; where previously there may have been submission, 
albeit resentful, there is now self-assertion.”). 
 100. See Archibald Cox & John T. Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by 
the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 389 (1950) (“The purpose of the 
original Wagner Act was to facilitate the organization of unions and the establishment of 
collective bargaining relationships. . . .  The Wagner Act was not concerned, except inciden-
tally, with what took place after the proper union had been recognized by the employer and 
negotiations got under way.”). 
 101. See NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952) (“The National 
Labor Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging the making of 
voluntary agreements governing relations between unions and employers.  The Act does not 
compel any agreement whatsoever between employees and employers. . . .  The theory of the 
Act is that the making of voluntary labor agreements is encouraged by protecting employees’ 
rights to organize for collective bargaining and by imposing on labor and management the 
mutual obligation to bargain collectively.”). 
 102. Chamberlain, supra note 58, at 831, 836 (“Our whole system of collective bar-
gaining has been reared on the implicit premise that either union or management might 
refuse to consummate a contract. . . .  [But if] it is the policy of the United States to encour-
age the practice of collective bargaining, that is to say collective contracting, we must face 
the fact that we have provided and can provide but a weak reed of support for such a system 
if we presume its voluntary nature.  In collective bargaining, no alternative exists to the con-
clusion of some contract.”).   
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of labor.  Pro-employer and pro-labor agendas and ideologies converged on 
a procedural approach to labor reform predicated on a myth of potential 
equality.  Later, the ambiguities of the statutory regime of collective bar-
gaining were resolved in a manner that cemented the procedural interpreta-
tion of the NLRA regime.   
The origins of the NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, explain a 
great deal of its emphasis on unionization and collective bargaining per se, 
and its related failure to specify a program reasonably calculated to bring 
about the lasting social reform to which at least some of its proponents as-
pired.  First, in the midst of depression, industrial peace was the most im-
mediate aim of the Act.103  Second, as unions were growing but had not yet 
become as numerous or powerful as they would in the immediate aftermath 
of the Act, the Act reflected not a political triumph, but an abstract ideal of 
business harmony imposed from above.  Whether this quasi-corporatist vi-
sion would succeed depended on numerous factors, each of which escalated 
uncertainty regarding the future operation of the Act, including employers’ 
and unions’ inclination to cooperate and union capacity to exact peaceful 
cooperation.  Finally, in part because of this uncertainty regarding the op-
erational outcomes of the Act, the political and judicial future of the Act 
itself was uncertain.  If it managed to survive judicial scrutiny, it might not 
survive legislative turnover or administrative undercutting.  Employers were 
unlikely to accept anything more than the already seemingly radical reforms 
the Act represented, and excess ambition on the part of labor was neither 
feasible nor advisable.   
A.  The Priority of Industrial Peace 
For one of the legislative acts most associated with labor’s quest for 
distributive justice, the NLRA is remarkable in its open focus on altogether 
different purposes.  Section 1 of the Act describes how the failure of em-
ployers to recognize collective bargaining resulted in strikes that interfered 
with commerce.104  This reference to maintaining open channels of com-
merce was more than lip service to establish federal authority to act.  The 
Act was passed in a depression with widespread worker unrest, especially in 
the form of strikes for union recognition.105  The avoidance of strikes and 
  
 103. See infra Section III.A. 
 104. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 105. See Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 
1407 (1958) (“The simplest and most direct purpose was to reduce the number of strikes for 
union recognition.  Prior to 1935 the outright refusal of employers to deal with a labor union 
was a prolific cause of industrial strife.  The cause could be eliminated by placing an em-
ployer under a statutory duty to acknowledge as the legal representative of all his employees 
any union designated by the majority.”). 
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other disruptions to industry was subsequently recognized as the essential 
purpose of the Act.106 
To be sure, the Act had other purposes.  Section 1 also identified “in-
equality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full 
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are 
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association” as the 
cause of unrest.107  This inequality did not just disrupt the flow of com-
merce, but also “aggravate[d] recurrent business depressions, by depressing 
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by 
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working condi-
tions within and between industries.”108  The goal of raising workers’ wages 
appeared calculated to promote consumption and industrial peace, not redi-
stribution.  Tibor Machan has argued that even to the extent the Act can be 
understood to have been aimed at improving the circumstances of workers, 
or of executing the “moral duty” toward those badly off, this otherwise pri-
vate moral duty was “politicized” only because doing so advanced social 
welfare overall.109  Thus, in his account, the aims of correcting an imbalance 
in bargaining power and reducing the suffering of workers are inadequate in 
themselves to explain the Act without further reference to the general public 
interest in recognizing those aims and imposing duties on employers in or-
der to effectuate them.110   
Of the various goals adopted in the Act, only equality of bargaining 
power and industrial democracy might be connected to status and distribu-
tive justice.  Archibald Cox, while naming the reduction of industrial strife 
as the immediate purpose of the Act, did say that “[t]he most important pur-
pose of the Wagner Act was to create aggregations of economic power on 
the side of employees countervailing the existing power of corporations to 
establish labor standards.”111  But the correction of bargaining power in-
equality was widely regarded as important because it produced a litany of 
economic ills, and having facilitated employer recognition of unions, the 
  
 106. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) 
(citing NLRA provision that the goal is to “minimize[e] industrial strife”).  See also Richard 
A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legisla-
tion, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1363 (1983) (“While income redistribution to union employees 
from (amongst others) their employers was one apparent consequence of [the Norris-
LaGuardia and the NLRA], their passage was not overtly justified in these terms.  Instead, it 
was said that the statutes were not designed to repudiate the market or to confiscate employer 
wealth.  The statutes were said to be designed to cure the present system of its imperfections 
. . . .”). 
 107. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Tibor R. Machan, Some Philosophical Aspects of National Labor Policy, 4 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 95-105 (1981). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Cox, supra note 105, at 1407. 
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Act was designed to do little more.  Cox describes as influential Chief Jus-
tice Taft’s comment in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades 
Council, in which Taft explains that labor unions 
were organized out of the necessities of the situation.  A single employee was help-
less in dealing with an employer.  He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage 
for the maintenance of himself and family.  If the employer refused to pay him the 
wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to 
resist arbitrary and unfair treatment.  Union was essential to give laborers opportu-
nity to deal on equality with their employer.112   
The Act similarly presumed that bargaining equality was not just necessary, 
but also sufficient to achieve its various purposes.113 
The Act was promoted and passed with the help of numerous individ-
uals and groups, so it is not possible to reduce their motivations to a single 
purpose, or even a single, fixed hierarchy of aims.114  But the purposes ma-
nifest in the structure of the Act, or in its silence with respect to the precise 
scope and nature of employers’ duties upon union recognition and the re-
medies available upon their failure to comply in a timely manner, may be 
traceable in part to a genuine expectation that the Act would usher in a long-
lasting era of something more than industrial peace: a full-fledged organized 
economy.  Michael Wachter has recently argued that the NLRA, coming 
after the Supreme Court struck down the more expansive National Industrial 
Recovery Act, sought to initiate a corporatist-like scheme of economic go-
vernance in the United States.115  This ambition crystallized in the years 
after the passage of the Act, as the imperatives of war accentuated the im-
  
 112. Id. at 1407-08 (citing Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 
U.S. 184, 209 (1921)). 
 113. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor 
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1511, 1545 (1981) (“Industrial pluralism[, the prevailing approach 
to the NLRA,] is the view that collective bargaining is self-government by management and 
labor . . . .  [It] is based upon a false assumption: the assumption that management and labor 
have equal power in the workplace.”). 
 114. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 16 
(1994); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. 
L. REV. 423, 453-61 (1988); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legis-
lative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).  See also generally Daniel 
P. O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and Methods of 
Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177 (2008). 
 115. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competi-
tive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 583 (2007) (explaining the decline of unions in the last 
several decades as a misfit between their anticompetitive premises and the increasingly free 
market economy); Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflec-
tions on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1029 
(1984) (observing that the Wagner Act was part of a broad experiment with “collectivist 
solutions to economic problems”). 
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portance of continuous production.116  Had this grand experiment with qua-
si-corporatist institutions succeeded, the narrow purposes of the Act may 
have achieved the wider ambition of the labor movement (albeit at substan-
tial cost, such that its success may not have been desirable).  At the time of 
the NLRA, it was simply unknown whether it would be struck down like its 
predecessor, the National Industrial Recovery Act;117 that danger warned 
against excessive detail, and, in particular, excessive restriction on the tradi-
tional prerogatives of employers.  But if the Act survived judicial scrutiny, 
it was also unknown whether and for how long the quasi-corporatist model 
of which it was intended to be a part would last.  And since that model was 
hitherto largely unknown in the United States, its distributional outcomes 
could not be predicted either. 
B.  Caution under Uncertainty 
Still another set of structural conditions helps to explain the narrow 
procedural character of the NLRA.  American political institutions had 
proven distinctly inhospitable to labor in the decades leading up to passage 
of the Act.  William Forbath has explained how the fragmented political 
structure of the United States created too many points of entry and influence 
for labor and its opponents; legislative battle for representatives, senators, 
and executives at both the state and federal levels was extremely costly with 
limited return.118  The absence of an elite civil service with a stake in regula-
tory reform disadvantaged the American labor movement relative to its 
peers in other countries such as England.119  Its absence was intended; both 
courts and politicians resisted the creation of administrative officers charged 
with oversight of the workplace, perceiving them as threats to their respec-
tive powers.120  Most importantly, hard-won legislative victories were fre-
quently overturned or undercut by the judiciary.121  While the American 
labor movement began more committed to a radical reworking of the em-
ployment relation than were some of its foreign counterparts, by the end of 
  
 116. See Virginia A. Seitz, Legal, Legislative, and Managerial Responses to the 
Organization of Supervisory Employees in the 1940’s, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 199, 210 
(1984) (“[T]he war demanded uninterrupted production.  The government could not permit 
employers to take long strikes.  Both the WLB and the NLRB were motivated by the need to 
avert work stoppages which would impair the war effort.”). 
 117. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) 
(invalidating provisions of NIRA); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 392 (1935) 
(same). 
 118. See William E. Forbath, Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England 
and America: A Study of the Constitutive Power of Law, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 10 
(1991). 
 119. Id. at 13. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 17. 
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the nineteenth century, voluntarist strategies prevailed over a broad legisla-
tive reform agenda.122  While still involved in politics, given the frequency 
with which their legislative accomplishments were struck down by courts, 
the labor movement’s primary goal was to “halt[] . . . judicial interven-
tion[].”123  It is not surprising, then, that the labor movement would settle for 
and perhaps not even seek more than the bare-bones framework of collec-
tive bargaining offered by the NLRA.  Between the urgency of industrial 
peace, vague visions of an organized economy, and the perceived futility of 
a detailed overhaul of the workplace, it was perhaps over-determined that 
the Act would fail either to spell out the steps by which to finally rid the 
United States of status inequality, or even to adopt that purpose as one in the 
light of which its ambiguities should be resolved going forward. 
C.  Entrenchment of the Procedural Interpretation of the Act 
The end of World War II quickly clarified that many of the uncertain-
ties and ambiguities in the NLRA would be decided to the general disadvan-
tage of workers.  Once the favorable economic conditions and the impera-
tive of wartime industrial peace had passed, employers renewed resistance 
to unionization and collective bargaining, and a new wave of industrial un-
rest ensued.124  The Republican Party won control of Congress in the mid-
term elections of 1946, and, in June 1947, they passed the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (Taft−Hartley Act or LMRA).125  The LMRA amended 
the NLRA to give the President and Attorney General the power to end 
strikes under certain circumstances.  It also added numerous basic restric-
tions on labor, banning secondary boycotts,126 sympathy boycotts,127 juris-
dictional strikes,128 and closed shops.129  It required union officers to swear 
  
 122. Id. at 16-18.  See also Sean Wilentz, Against Exceptionalism: Class Conscious-
ness and the American Labor Movement, 1790-1920, 26 INT’L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 
1, 10 (1984) (“[T]he Jacksonian labor movement proclaimed, with unprecendented clarity, 
that the issues at stake concerned the character of property and the nature of the wage rela-
tion itself.”). 
 123. See Forbath, supra note 118, at 16, 20.  Forbath offers the example of the strug-
gle for an eight-hour day.  Id. at 17-18.  Labor leaders concluded that it was likely unconsti-
tutional, but could be won by collective bargaining.  Id. 
 124. See Seitz, supra note 116, at 235-36. 
 125. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2006).  See generally Thomas Robert Mulroy, The 
Taft–Hartley Act in Action, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 595 (1948) (describing largely pro-
management changes brought about by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947). 
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2006). 
 127. Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
 128. See Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D), § 160(k).  See generally NLRB v. Radio & Television 
Broad. Eng’rs Union, Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573 (1961). 
 129. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (2006). 
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they were not communists.130  About a decade later, the 1959 Landrum–
Griffin Amendments to the Act prohibited consumer picketing of suppliers 
and customers, and outlawed hot-cargo agreements.131  
Finally, a long string of judicial decisions restricted the efficacy of 
collective bargaining as a tool by which to achieve substantive aims of la-
bor.132  As soon as 1938, the Supreme Court delivered one of the most im-
portant decisions in setting the balance of power between the now ostensi-
bly equal parties of labor and management.  In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & 
Telegraph Co., the Supreme Court unanimously held that it was not an un-
fair labor practice for employers to replace striking workers.133  Moreover, 
employers were not required to fire replacement workers when the strike 
was over; it was permissible, in fact, to promise those workers permanent 
employment.134  Needless to say, while serving well the cause of continuity 
in industrial production, the decision substantially blunted labor’s primary 
weapon, the strike. 
But the Court went further.  It announced that it could not “act at large 
in equalizing disparities of bargaining power between employer and un-
ion.”135  But there was nothing natural or inevitable about existing dispari-
ties; rather, they were reinforced by pragmatic attempts to minimize the 
public cost of the private economic warfare invited by the Act.136  In Ameri-
can Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, the Court held that while an employer may 
not “use[] a lockout as a means to injure a labor organization or to evade his 
duty to bargain collectively,” it was free to temporarily layoff employees in 
order to bring economic pressure to bear in support of the employer’s bar-
gaining position after an impasse has been reached.137  But in NLRB v. Retail 
  
 130. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) 
(repealed 1959). 
 131. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (e) (2006). 
 132. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins 
of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 291, 298-300 (1978) 
(arguing that the Act’s ambiguous provisions were interpreted literally to permit employees 
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employee relations were a matter for private ordering, and that government could not set 
terms or otherwise interfere in bargaining); Staughton Lynd, Government Without Rights: 
The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 483, 483-84, 486 (1981) (ar-
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al peace but that, since 1947, the Court has advanced the latter interpretation).  It has taken 
unions and collective bargaining as ends in themselves.  Id. at 488. 
 133. 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). 
 134. Id. at 346. 
 135. NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960). 
 136. See Stone, supra note 113, at 1547 (arguing that the procedural interpretation of 
the Act brings employers to the table but does not equalize bargaining power).  A “procedur-
al” interpretation removes many traditional labor weapons from the table, such as secondary 
and consumer boycotts; its restrictions on employers are less invasive.  Id. 
 137. 380 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1965). 
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Store Employees Union, the Court held it was unlawful to picket outside 
insurance companies in order to put pressure on their primary customer, 
Safeco, because the action was calculated to result in no business for those 
companies, which would result in substantial loss to them.138  Repeatedly, 
the Court felt constrained or entitled, in light of the limited aims associated 
with the Act, not to interfere or impose itself in collective bargaining.  The 
Court sustained background norms of employer control, which, after all, the 
Act had never identified as its target, and minimized commercial disruption, 
which had been expressly named as the Act’s primary object. 
The Court has avoided industrial unrest on too wide a range of is-
sues.139  In NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., it held that employ-
ers were entitled to insist on a “management functions clause” that would 
reserve various areas to complete management discretion, including hiring, 
promoting, disciplining, and scheduling.140  This prerogative, it held, fol-
lowed from the fact that employers are not required to make any conces-
sions to unions, and courts, including the NLRB, are not entitled to “sit in 
judgment []on . . . [the] terms of [a] collective bargaining agreement.”141  In 
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, the Court held that employers 
are only required to “bargain[] over management decisions that have a sub-
stantial impact on the continued availability of employment . . . if the bene-
fit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, 
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.”142  In particu-
lar, because “the harm likely to be done to an employer’s need to operate 
freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business . . . out-
weigh[ed] the incremental benefit that might be gained through [a] union’s 
participation in making th[at] decision,” the Act would not be construed to 
mandate bargaining on such decisions.143  The Act was read by the courts 
not only to entrench a deep asymmetry in economic power, but to limit the 
ends toward which unions and collective bargaining could be employed.144  
Eventually, the language of class and the concept of status became 
anathema even to labor.  Class and status openly pegged workers as mem-
bers of a socially stigmatized group.  It simply became more strategic to 
invoke the encompassing and appealing cloak of universal middle-classness.  
  
 138. 447 U.S. 607, 613-15 (1980). 
 139. See generally NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 
(1958) (limiting the subjects of bargaining). 
 140. 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
 141. Id. at 401-04. 
 142. 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981). 
 143. Id. at 686. 
 144. See Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of 
Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 455 (1981) (“Collective bargaining limits 
worker participation” by deflecting away from “the organization of the work process, enter-
prise management and goals, and the internal direction of labor unions.”). 
Fall] The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation 623 
As Margo Anderson explains, “the very denial of class distinctions could be 
turned around and used as a weapon for demanding better wages, fringe 
benefits, and mobility for one’s children.”145  The unfavorable conditions in 
which many workers found themselves were explained by reference to other 
aspects of their identities, such as race, ethnicity, sex, or region.146  But not-
withstanding the disappearing language of class, the reality of status is ever-
present.147 
D. Doctrinal Implications 
The myth of equality between workers and employers in the collective 
bargaining context is different from the parallel myth in the context of the 
individual employment relation.  While it is commonly recognized, at least 
in political discourse, that many workers are in a disadvantaged social posi-
tion, unions are sometimes perceived as frighteningly omnipotent and capa-
ble of coercing employers—especially in the public sector—into inefficient 
long-term agreements that harm consumers and taxpayers.148  There is some 
truth to that image: some unions are very powerful in particular markets, 
and the long-term effects (e.g. as a result of pension plans) of collective 
bargaining agreements in industries that were protected, but are now subject 
to foreign competition, do impose substantial costs on firms still subject to 
those agreements.  The ongoing crisis of the American auto sector and the 
earlier collapse of American steel are prime examples.  Public sector unions 
are also uniquely situated and exercise enormous power without direct mar-
ket constraints. 
But the rapidly diminishing rate of unionization in the private sector 
attests to the overall weakness of the labor movement today.  More specifi-
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 146. Id. at 368. 
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cally, unions find it difficult to organize workers.149  This is in part because 
of the challenges of the certification process itself, even where unions are 
initially supported by a majority of employees in a potential bargaining unit, 
and in part because it is increasingly difficult for unions to effectively advo-
cate for employees upon unionization, due to the various structural disad-
vantages that plague their bargaining position.150  As a result of these ob-
stacles, unions are less able than ever to operate as a means by which work-
ers may secure higher income, more leisure, and more voice in their em-
ployment relations.  Three doctrinal changes would help unions play that 
role in alleviating status. 
The first has already been proposed in the Employee Free Choice Act 
(EFCA).151  The EFCA would direct the NLRB to certify a union as a bar-
gaining representative upon securing cards indicating support from a ma-
jority of the members of a bargaining unit, without elaborate and extended 
election procedures.152  Paul Weiler and others proposed this alternative to 
elections a while back,153 but under a Democratic Congress and with the 
support of President Obama, the legislation—or at least this component of 
the legislation—has a real possibility of enactment.  Enactment is still far 
from certain, however, given robust opposition from Republican leadership 
and the likely defection of some Democrats. 
Union leaders, as well as politicians and scholars, have long com-
plained of employer tactics of intimidation and delay, most of which are 
effectively irremediable even in those few cases where unions manage the 
extended judicial hurdles involved in having those tactics named unfair la-
bor practices.154  These tactics not only make organizing prohibitively ex-
  
 149. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-
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pensive, they also make it ineffective even where affordable.  Initial support 
for a union is reliably diffused as would-be bargaining unit members come 
to appreciate the vehemence of employer opposition.  They come to under-
stand that employers are not only willing to engage in hostile, punitive be-
havior toward union supporters, but are also usually able to get away with it. 
Of course, there is a reason that employers are entitled to demand an 
election by secret ballot.  The first reason is misguided; the second overem-
phasized to the exclusion of other values.  Weiler explains that the intuition 
behind the secret ballot requirement lies in our association between unions 
and legislatures.155  But we overestimate the juridical power of unions.  Un-
ions do not exercise legislative authority over employees, nor may they act 
freely and unilaterally as full counterweights to employers.  Indeed, they are 
not able to impose any conditions on anyone without further manifestation 
of consent.  They can effectively exercise power on behalf of employees 
only to the extent employees are prepared to back up their demands to em-
ployers by going on strike, or by manifesting support in more subtle ways.156  
A union that makes proposals that do not have widespread support in the 
bargaining unit can win nothing for that bargaining unit.  Nor can the union 
impose terms on employers.  It is a central tenet of the collective bargaining 
model that employers are not required to make any concessions.  While they 
are no doubt affected by what demands are made, given their legal and eco-
nomic power to resist employee demands, an employer’s stake in having a 
voice in the process that sets the employees’ agenda is quite limited. 
The second reason for requiring a full-blown election for bargaining 
representatives stems from the ideal of reflective deliberation and choice on 
the part of employees.  All else equal, it is preferable that employee en-
dorsement of a union is made with the maximum amount of information 
regarding the union and the likely consequences of unionization, and with 
an extended period for discussion and persuasion.  But, of course, all else is 
not equal.  The provision of information is skewed as a result of the dispari-
ty in authority and resources the union and employer may bring to bear on 
the election process, and the information provided is interspersed with un-
lawful threats (as the boundary between such threats and lawful statements 
of intent is ambiguous).  The period of persuasion is also one of intimida-
  
ers’ Right to Choose Under the National Labor Relations Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 
312 (2008). 
 155. See Weiler, supra note 149, at 1809 (“[A]n ingrained premise of the American 
model is that certification confers on the trade union a quasi-governmental authority over the 
employees and therefore requires a procedure comparable to that by which a government is 
chosen.”). 
 156. See id. at 1811 (“[T]o achieve any degree of real authority in the bargaining unit 
and to win a decent contract that will give collective action a reasonable prospect of survival, 
the union must obtain a strike mandate from the employees.  In practice this requires not just 
a bare majority, but a solid one.”). 
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tion.  In light of the fact that the endorsement of a union is of limited direct 
effect—again, the union has no power to institute changes without the co-
operation and consent of both members of the bargaining unit and the em-
ployer—we should reassess the tradeoff between effective use of unions as 
a means by which to promote employee interests, and the general interest in 
ever more informed and deliberate choice.  We should give more weight to 
the former than current law allows, and the card-check provision of EFCA 
would move in that direction. 
A second reform that would move us away from the implicit and 
flawed assumption of equality between unions and employers would be to 
expand the role of unions in important decisions that fall outside the scope 
of mandatory bargaining.  Even if there is no bargaining required pursuant 
to First National, employers might still be required to provide relevant fi-
nancial and other business information to unions and accept and review 
proposals from the earliest stage at which major business decisions are be-
gun.  There is no essential reason that the requirement to provide informa-
tion be tied to a requirement to bargain.  The provision of information in the 
absence of a duty to bargain will not empower unions to extract concessions 
from employers.  But it delivers at least two benefits.  First, it would enable 
unions to make plausible suggestions to the employer.  Over time, one could 
expect unions would be in a better negotiating position with respect to not 
just the particular employers who have shared information, but other em-
ployers too, since access to information will educate a cadre of union offic-
ers about the market.  Second, by enabling the union to provide a realistic 
picture of a firm’s business position to its members, an information re-
quirement will mitigate employees’ experience of passive subjection to dis-
tant market forces and facilitate their long-term planning. 
A final, more ambitious change to the operation of the NLRA regime 
would be to redefine the scope of its coverage.  Section 2 of the Act defines 
“employee” so as to exclude “any individual employed as a supervisor,” and 
defines a “supervisor” as “any individual having authority, in the interest of 
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, 
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, 
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action.”157  
The Supreme Court has endorsed a “three-part test for determining supervi-
sory status.”158  Courts are to ask with respect to a given group of employees 
whether “(1) they hold the authority to engage in any 1 of the 12 listed su-
pervisory functions, (2) their ‘exercise of such authority is not of a merely 
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment,’ 
  
 157. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11) (2006). 
 158. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 712-13 (2001) (quoting 
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and (3) their authority is held ‘in the interest of the employer.’”159  The labor 
movement has long protested the exclusion of employees with only limited 
supervisory functions from the scope of the Act.  Most recently, they pro-
moted legislation that would narrow the definition of a supervisory em-
ployee.160  However, the bills have not progressed in either the House or the 
Senate. 
The change proposed here is not merely to narrow the concept of the 
supervisory employee, but to consciously define “employee” in a manner 
that tracks status.  Recognizing that collective bargaining involves certain 
trade-offs, we should assess the end for which we accept its costs.  That end, 
I suggest, should be the amelioration of status.  We should make the limited 
protections and assistance that the NLRA affords available accordingly.  
High-status employees, including well-paid sports players and entertainers, 
should not be entitled to participate in the NLRA regime.  Only relatively 
low-paid employees with limited leisure and discretion should have access 
to it.  To some extent, such a reorientation of the concept of “employee” 
will track existing coverage, inasmuch as employees with supervisory re-
sponsibilities are more likely to be high-status.  But because status is multi-
dimensional, drawing the boundaries of “employee” under the NLRA with 
such a reference point will produce results different from the present focus 
on the extent to which the employee acts as the employer’s agent when 
managing other employees.  It may bear closer resemblance to the exemp-
tion for “executive, administrative, or professional” employees found in the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, which imposes work time and other restrictions 
on most employees.161   
As was the case with the present definition of employee, it will take 
numerous administrative and judicial decisions to work out the precise 
boundaries of a status-based definition of “employee” for purposes of the 
NLRA.  The resulting definition is unlikely to map perfectly onto low- and 
high-status categories, not least because the content of those categories, 
together with the large and amorphous group of middle-status employees, 
varies over time and depends on normative aims more specific than those 
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set out here.  Moreover, it is likely that the aims of collective bargaining 
unrelated to status, including industrial peace and business performance, 
will and should continue to be given substantial weight.  With this plurality 
of legitimate purpose, status-based employee classifications are bound to be 
controversial and unsettled—much like any other definition of covered em-
ployee ever employed.  But it will be a step forward to move beyond a false 
image of the NLRA regime as one in which allowing workers to unionize—
after jumping through a sufficient number of hoops—and then giving them 
the opportunity to bargain with employers under severely restricted condi-
tions, is sufficient to substantially improve their status.  For most workers, it 
has not done enough. 
CONCLUSION 
For most people, the employment relation is a vital one.  It is vital in 
that much else that is valuable in one’s life depends on it.  But it is also vital 
in that, because it determines the circumstances in which we spend most of 
our days, our place in the employment relation comes to shape our sense of 
self, as well as others’ impressions of us—and the latter feeds back again 
into our own self-image. 
It is thus worthwhile to rethink false assumptions that underlie legal 
regulation of the employment relation.  We can better understand widely 
perceived defects in the experience of employment if we do not attempt to 
trace them to status-neutral concepts, such as disparity in bargaining power.  
We can make unions a more effective institutional tool if we do not imagine 
that their bare-boned legal status will suffice to reshape the workplace.  
Thinking openly about status will not only bring into focus an overlooked 
but essential dimension of distributive justice, but also will help us identify 
what we can do to mitigate the negative, pervasive experience of employ-
ment-based status. 
